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Limiting Incarceration for Civil Contempt 
in Child Custody Cases 
David J. Harmer* 
"[T]he present manner of exercising contempt power may do more to 
degrade and impugn the dignity of the judiciary than the very conduct 
which constitutes the contempt."1 
INTRODUCTION 
United States Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) and Representa-
tive Frank Wolf (R-Va.) are not the first to identify, nor is Dr. Eliza-
beth Morgan the first to experience, injustice in the application of the 
contempt power. However, these three individuals-two legislators and 
one contemnor-are among the few ever to have wrought significant 
change in the law of contempt. On September 23, 1989, Congress 
passed and sent to the President Public Law No. 101-97,2 which limits 
imprisonment for civil contempt in child custody cases in the District of 
Columbia to one year. 3 Based on bills introduced by Hatch and Wolf 
in response to Dr. Morgan's plight,• this measure serves as a model for 
reform in the forty-eight states lacking similar limits. 5 
On August 26, 1987, Dr. Morgan was held in contempt of court 
for defying a District of Columbia Superior Court order to deliver her 
* B.A., Brigham Young University, 1984; J.D., Brigham Young University, J. Reuben 
Clark Law School, 1988; Minority Counsel, Subcommittee on Patents, Copyrights and Trade-
marks, Committee on the Judiciary, United States Senate, 1988-1989; Frllow, Collrgr of Publir 
lntrrrsl Law, Pacific Legal Foundation, 1989-1990; on lrm•r from O'Melveny & Myers, Los 
Angeles; member, California Bar. This paprr was prrparrd undrr thr sponsorship of Pacific 
Vgol Foundation\ Collrgr of Public Intrrrst Law. Pacific Lrgal Foundation is a nonprofit, 
public intrrr1t !au• }inn u•hirh litigatrs in dtfrnsr of indi1•idual and rronomic frtf!loms. 
1. E. DANGEL, PrPjaa to NATIONAL LAWYERS' MANUAL, ContrmjJt (1939). 
2. Public Law No. 101-97, 103 Stat. 633 (1989), is reproduced in Appendix I. 
3. The one-year limitation is not absolute; sre infra section IV of this article. 
4. Representative Wolf's bill, H.R. 2136, is reproduced in Appendix II. Senator Hatch's bill, 
S. 1163, is reproduced in Appendix III. They are discussed infra in section IV of this article. 
5. Wisconsin and California already limit incarceration for contempt. Wisconsin has abol-
ished the civil/criminal distinction and limits incarceration for any contempt to six months. Cali-
fornia treats all con tempts as misdemeanors, the trials of which require due process protections not 
always available to civil contemnors in other jurisdictions, and limits incarceration for contempt to 
one year. Srr infra section V-B of this article. 
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five-year-old daughter Hilary to Dr. Eric Foretich, her ex-husband, for 
two weeks of unsupervised visitation. 6 Morgan had repeatedly accused 
Foretich of sexually abusing Hilary. Foretich denied any misconduct. 
Although Morgan's allegations were substantiated by several child psy-
chologists and pediatricians who had examined Hilary, she was unable 
to prove them in court. 7 Hers was a Hobson's choice: either surrender 
her daughter to a man she was convinced had repeatedly sexually 
abused the girl or face indefinite imprisonment. Morgan chose the lat-
ter. Having abandoned her home, her medical practice, and her free-
dom, she endured over two years in jail. Had Congress not acted, she 
would, in all likelihood, remain there still. 8 
Numerous notes and articles have considered issues raised by ap-
plication of the contempt power in child support cases;9 but hardly any 
have discussed the much more interesting and troublesome questions 
surrounding the use of civil contempt in child custody cases. 10 This ar-
ticle attempts to fill that void by reviewing the dangers of the contempt 
power, examining Dr. Morgan's experience as an illustration of them, 
and describing the recent reform enacted in response to her case. It 
urges Congress to make the reform permanent, broadening it to include 
all civil contempt, and urges other jurisdictions to adopt similar 
reforms. 
I. THE CoNTEMPT PowER 
A. The Source of the Contempt Power 
1. Statutory authorit_y for the contempt power 
Contempt is: 
an act of disobedience or disrespect toward a judicial or legislative 
6. ,\1orr;nn OrdrrNI To Vt l:\-Hu1band Fi1il Child; Doctor Fal'l'l Fmr, }11il }or Xonrmn-
pliancr, Wa>hington Post, Aug 27, 19R7, at C6, col. I. 
7. But sn Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 943-44 (4th Cir. 1988) (the district court 
improperly excluded "highly relevant" evidence of similar sexual abuse suffered by Heather, 
Foretich's daughter by his second marriage). Srt gmnally infra section III of this article. 
8. Srr injra sections III and IV of this article. 
9. Sre, r.g., H.rcent Drufiopmeni1-Domestic Rrlatums: Enformnmt of Clllld Suf!port Ohli-
r;ations Through Ci1•il Con/elllf!/, 6 AM. J. TRIAL Aovoc. 347 (1982); Maidment, Thr Lmc of 
Contnnpt and Famzly L11u•, 13 FAM. LAw 127 (1983); Note, Thr Conlrmjil Stalutr.l: At Orlrls 
With Domr.stic r~·nj;lrmnmt?, 29 S.D.L. REv. 164 (1983); Note, Florida'., L'sr of Contnnpt Pro-
cePdlllgs to Fnjorcr' Chi/•/ SujljNJrt Arreamw': hnjmsonmmt for Debt?, 12 SnTSON L. REV. 
526 (1983); Turner, Contempt and Punishmrnt for Non-SupjJorl, 36 Juv. & FAM. Gr. J. 87 
(1985). 
10. The best. and perhaps only, comprehensive discussion is found in Ape!, Cusl!HII(z/ P(lr-
en/.,, Child Sexu"l :1/Juw, and the Lrgal Systnn: Beyond Crm/nnjJt, 38 AM. U.L. REV. 491 
(1989). 
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body of government, or interference with its orderly process, for 
which a summary punishment is usually exacted. In a broader, more 
general view, it is a power assumed by governmental bodies to coerce 
cooperation, and punish criticism or interference, even of a causally 
indirect nature. 11 
241 
Congress has specifically authorized the exercise of contempt power by 
the federal courts. In fact, Congress has granted federal judges virtually 
unbridled discretion over certain kinds of contempt: 
A court of the United States shall have power to punish by fine 
or imprisonment, at its discretion, such contempt of its authority, and 
none other, as--
( 1) Misbehavior of any person in its presence or so near thereto 
as to obstruct the administration of justice; 
(2) Misbehavior of any of its officers in their official 
transactions; 
(3) Disobedience or resistance to its lawful writ, process, order, 
rule, decree, or command. 12 
Note the absence of statutory limits on the amount of the fine or the 
duration of the imprisonment. Note also the statute's vagueness. "Diso-
bedience" may be easily defined, but "misbehavior" and "resistance" 
are vague terms subject to inconsistent and arbitrary interpretation. 
A more specific procedure governs the prosecution of contumacious 
acts which are also criminal offenses: 
Any person, corporation or association willfully disobeying any 
!awful writ, process, order, rule, decree, or command of any district 
court of the United States or any court of the District of Columbia, by 
doing any act or thing therein, or thereby forbidden, if the act or 
thing so done be of such character as to constitute also a criminal 
offense under any statute of the United States or under the laws of 
any State in which the act was committed, shall be prosecuted for 
such contempt as provided in section 3691 of this title and 'hall be 
punished by fine or imprisonment, or both. 13 
However, the judiciary may deal with other contempts without further 
statutory constraint: "all other cases of contempt not specifically em-
11. R. GoLDFARB, THE CoNTEMPT PowER 1 (1963); Sff also 17 AM. juR. 2o Contnnpt § 
3 (1964). 
12. 18 L.S.C. § 401 (1982). 
13. 18 U.S. C. § 402 ( 1 '182). Section 3691 provides that when an action charged as contempt 
also constitutes a criminal offense, the accused has the right to a trial by jury, "which shall con-
form as near as may be to the practice in other criminal cases." 18 U.S.C. § 3691 (1982). The 
right does not apply to ·'contempts committed in the presence of the court, or so near thereto as to 
obstruct the administration of justice, nor to contempts committed in disobedience of any lawful 
. order" entered in suits brought by or on behalf of the United States. !d. 
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braced in this section may be punished in conformity to the prevailing 
usages at law." 14 Many state legislatures have granted their courts sim-
ilar authority .111 
2. Non-statutory authority for the contempt power 
Despite that long leash, many courts claim the right to exercise the 
contempt power, regardless of whether the legislature so authorizes 
them. The Supreme Court maintains that the contempt power is inher-
ent in the judiciary and independent of the Legislature. This view dates 
back at least to 1812.16 As early as 187 4 the Court said: 
The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts 
.. The moment the courts of the United States were called into 
existence and invested with jurisdiction over any subject, they became 
possessed of this power. But the power has been limited and defined 
by [an act of Congress]. The act, in terms, applies to all courts; 
whether it can be held to limit the authority of the Supreme Court, 
which derives its existence and powers from the Constitution may 
perhaps, be a matter of doubt .... " 17 
The opinion goes on to acknowledge congressional authority over the 
federal circuit and district courts. 18 However, a few years later the 
Court appeared to assert on behalf of at least the circuit courts that 
" '[ t ]he power to punish for con tempts is inherent in the nature and 
constitution of a court. It is a power not derived from any statute 
. . . .' "
19 The Court accepts legislation which recognizes and enforces 
the contempt power,20 but might not accept legislation which limits it: 21 
That the power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts 
has been many times decided and may be regarded as settled law. It is 
essential to the administration of justice. The courts of the United 
14. 18 U.S.C. § 402 (1982). 
15. Srr Dobbs, Contnnpt of Court: A Sun.~ey, 56 CoRNELL L. REV. 183, 222 (1971) 
16. Sn United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
17. Ex pnrtr Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1874). 
18. !d. 
19. F,x p!irlr Terry, 128 U.S. 289, 303 (1888) (citation omitted). 
20. Srr Interstate Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447 (1894): 
From the very nature of their institution, and that their lawful judgments may be 
respected and enforced, the courts of the United States possess the power to punish for 
contempt. And this inherent power is recognized and enforced by a statute expresslv 
authorizing such courts to punish contempts of their authority . 
/d. at 489. 
21. The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts. The "general and inherent 
authority [to exercise contempt powers], of whatever nature, does not need any statutory grant of 
power, and is not subject to statutory restrictions." United States v. Shipp, 203 U.S. 563, 566 
(1906). 
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States, when called into existence and vested with jurisdiction over 
any subject, at once become possessed of the power. So far as the 
inferior federal courts are concerned, however, it is not beyond the 
authority of Congress; but the attributes which inhere in that power 
and are inseparable from it can neither be abrogated nor rendered 
practically inoperative. 22 
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Courts have "inherent power" not only "to enforce compliance 
with their lawful orders,"23 but to enforce compliance with their argua-
bly unlawful orders. 24 One federal court declared, "[T]his inherent au-
thority over contempt is rooted in the common law and has been recog-
nized in this country since early Colonial times." 25 The court went on 
to say that "it is doubtful that Congress could constitutionally wholly 
deprive a United States District Court of this power. ... " 26 
Legislative attempts to restrict the contempt power have occasion-
ally been challenged. 27 In 1971, the Kentucky Supreme Court declared 
unconstitutional a statute limiting punishment for contempt. 28 The 
same court later reaffirmed its inherent power without considering the 
constitutionality of a successor statute. 29 Ohio courts also claim con-
tempt authority independent of state statute under their inherent pow-
ers. 30 Other state courts claim inherent authority as well. 31 
"The power to punish for contempts is inherent in all courts," 
says one treatise. 32 
[T]his power exists by force of the constitution itself as an inherent 
power. If this proposition be true and respected, then no other power 
can control its exercise. The only question that can possibly arise is, 
whether the matter or conduct alleged is contempt, and to determine 
this, the court cannot be governed by statutory definitions or 
classifications. 33 
22. Michaelson v. United States rx rl'i. Chicago, St. P., M. & 0. Ry., 266 U.S. 42, 65-66 
(1924 ). 
23. Shillitani v. United States, 384 U.S. 364, 370 (1966). 
24. Srr United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258, 293-94 (1947). 
25. In rr Williams, 306 F. Supp 617, 619 (D.D.C. 1969). 
26. !d. 
27. Srr Martineau, ContnnjJI of Court: }.'iilllinating thr Confusion Bflwrrn Ch•il and Crilll-
inal CrmlfllljJI, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 679-80 (1981). 
28. Arnett v. Meade, 462 S.W.2d 940, 948 (Ky. 1971). 
29. Hardin v. Summitt, 627 S.W.2d 580, 582 (Ky. 1982); .w also Leathers, Cil•il Prorr-
durr, 71 KY. L.J. 395, 409-410 (1982-83). 
30. Zakany v. Zakany, 9 Ohio St. 3d 192, 459 N.E.2d 870 (1984) 
31. Srr, r.g., Curlee v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 382, 287 S.E.2d 915, 917 ( 1982). 
32. I W. BAILEY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF HABEAS CORPUS AND SPECIAL REMEDIES 
§ 64, at 219 (1913). 
33. !d., § 65, at 231 (emphasis added). 
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That's a big "if," but the author, like most courts, simply assumes the 
truth of the proposition. Even though the treatise dates from before 
World War I, its rationale, or lack thereof, remains widely accepted. 
The extent to which the current Supreme Court will accept legislative 
limitations on the contempt power is not certain, but it has recently 
reaffirmed that "it is long settled that courts possess inherent authority 
to initiate contempt proceedings."34 
3. Rationale for the contempt jwwer 
The American courts have created for themselves a body of legal 
authority which it is claimed gives to them the inherent right, in the 
absence of a limitation placed upon them by the power which created 
them, to punish as a contempt an act, whether committed in or out of 
its presence, which tends to impede, embarrass or obstruct the court 
in the discharge of its duties. This doctrine has been asserted in all its 
rigor by the courts. It is founded upon the principle that this power is 
coequal with the existence of the courts, and as necessary as the right 
of self-protection,-that it is a necessary incident to the execution of 
the powers conferred upon the courts, and is necessary to maintain its 
dignity if not its very existence. It exists independtntly of statutes. 36 
This attitude is as weak in foundation as it is long in history. The 
contempt power is "less unassailable than unquestioned."36 The inher-
ence of the power is usually explained by recourse to well-established 
precedent37-which proves to be tautological since the precedents cited 
ordinarily make the identical claim without justification. Contempt pro-
ceedings are undoubtedly efficient, but "[ c ]onsiderations of efficiency 
pale when compared to the possibility that a judge may abuse the 
power and infringe on fundamental notions of fairness through proce-
dural due process. If a procedure is efficient, but inherently unfair, it 
cannot be rationalized as an acceptable method of dealing with undesir-
able behavior. " 38 
The only justification courts have offered for the contempt power 
is its presumed necessity. It is among "the powers which cannot be 
dispensed with in a court, because [it is] necessary to the exercise of all 
others. " 39 It is "essential to the preservation of order in judicial pro-
34. Young v. United States rx rrl. Vuitton et Fils SA, 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987). 
35. E. DANGEL, NATIONAL LAWYERS' MANUAL, Con/rmjll 19b (1939). 
36. R. GoLDFARB, supra note 11, at 4. 
37. Srr, r.g., Young, 481 U.S. at 793, 795 n.7. 
38. Note, Thr Modrrn Status of thr Rulrs Prrmittin{!; a Jurlf!:r to Punish Dirrrt Contrmpt 
Summarily, 28 WM. & MARY L. REv. 553, 577 (1987); Sf/' rd.1o infra section II of this article. 
39. United States v. Hudson, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 32, 34 (1812). 
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ceedings, and to the enforcement of the judgments, orders and writs of 
the courts, and consequently to the due administration of justice."40 It 
"aris[es] from necessity" and is "implied, because it is necessary to the 
exercise of all other powers."41 "The power of contempt which a judge 
must have and exercise in protecting the due and orderly administra-
tion of justice, and in maintaining the authority and dignity of the 
court, is most important and indispensable."42 "[T]he necessities of the 
administration of justice require such summary dealing with obstruc-
tions to it."43 "Courts cannot be at the mercy of another branch" in 
initiating contempt proceedings. 44 
Although many courts and commentators have uncritically ac-
cepted "the firmly established view that contempt powers are a neces-
sary and inherent element of judicial power," modern research finds 
them neither inherent nor necessary. 4~ All courts in civil law countries, 
and some inferior courts in the United States and Britain, lack the con-
tempt power; yet they survive. 46 Obviously, then, it is something less 
than essential to the very existence of every court. The contempt power 
may be helpful, convenient, and efficient; but in a republic whose con-
stitution grants limited powers to the government, the government's 
convenience is insufficient justification, without more, for an unbridled 
use of the contempt power by the judiciary. 
B. The Histor_)' of the Contempt Power 
What is the source of this inherent power to punish for con-
tempt? The judiciary always refers to the common law and asserts 
that the power to protect itself from criticism is essential to its power 
to exist and function properly. The power of contempt was never 
given to the court by the people, by constitutional delegation or other-
wise, nor did it come from the early Common Law.47 
Evidence of something closely resembling the contempt power ap-
40. Ex parte Robinson, 86 U.S. (19 Wall.) 505, 510 (1873). See a/;o Ex parte Terry, 128 
U.S. 289, 302, 303 (1888); Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204, 227 (1821); In re Savin, 
131 U.S. 267, 27 4 ( 1889); Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36, 37 (1889); Interstate 
Commerce Comm'n v. Brimson, 154lJ.S. 447,489 (1894); and In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 595-56 
(1895) 
41. Ex parte Terry, 128 U.S. at 303 (citation omitted). 
42. Cooke v. Cnited States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925) (emphasis added). 
43. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 14 (1954). 
44. Young, 481 U.S. at 793, 796 (emphasis added). 
45. See Comment, The Role of Due Process in Summary Conlnnpt Proceedings, 68 IowA L. 
REV. 177 (1982). 
46. R. GoLDFARB, supra note 11, at 2, 23. 
47. E. DANGEL, sujna note 35, at 19c (citations omitted). 
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pears in the writings of the Emperor Justinian, the religious rules of 
the ancient Roman Popes, and the Theodosian Code. 48 The contempt 
power appeared in England by about the twelfth century, and it was 
well-established by the fourteenth!9 Neither the people nor their legis-
lators had any part in its establishment; rather, it "evolved from the 
divine law of kings," which emphasized "obedience, cooperation, and 
respect."~0 The courts adopted the power "less as adjuncts to the king 
than to protect their own dignity and supremacy."~ 1 The duty to re-
spect the king expanded into a duty to respect his representatives, in-
cluding the courts; to flaunt their orders was to flaunt the king himself. 
After all, he acted through them. The court of equity even used his 
seal. ~2 
The Judiciary Act of 1789 gave federal courts the same contempt 
powers that English courts had at common law.~3 American courts re-
lied on shaky authority in determining what those powers were. 
The present law of contempt in this country has been founded 
... upon the statements of Blackstone in his Commentaries and Sir 
John Eardley-Wilmot in King v. Almon which concerned a contempt 
by publication. Oddly enough, neither of these authorities forms a le-
gal precedent, for the opinion of Justice ... Wilmot was never deliv-
ered, as the case was dismissed because of technical difficulties. It also 
appears that in all probability the statements made by Blackstone 
merely represented the views of Judge Wilmot, and thus it may be 
said that the present scope of the summary power is due almost exclu-
sively to the opinion of one man.M 
Nevertheless, 
[b]y the twentieth century, the law of Wilmot had, like fine wme, 
aged to the point of unquestioning respect. English courts adopted the 
Almon decision, cited it, and extended it beyond even Wilmot's proba-
ble intent. 
The sometimes blind inheritance of common law in American 
legal attitudes bore this Almon-phenomenon of England to the United 
States, where it was early inculcated as a rule of law.~6 
The broad contempt powers claimed by American courts originated 
48. R. GOLDFARB, sujlm note 11, at 10. 
49. j. Fox, THE HISTORY OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 1 (1972). 
50. R. GoLDFARB, sujlra note 11, at 11. 
'i 1. I d. 
52. !d. at 12. 
53. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 169 (1958). 
54. THOMAS, PROBLEMS OF CONTEMPT OF COURT 5 (1934), quotnf in R. GoLDFARB, 
.\UjJra note 11, at 19. 
55. R. GOLDFARB, sujim note 11, at 19. 
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with the monarch and migrated on a misunderstanding. "[H]istorical 
assumptions regarding the procedure for punishment of contempt of 
court were ill-founded," Justice Frankfurter acknowledged, but that 
"hardly wipes out a century and a half of the legislative and judicial 
history of federal law based on such assumptions."116 
C. Distinctions Between Criminal and Civil Contempt 
Justice Frankfurter's observation would be less troubling if all 
contemnors were created equal. Unfortunately, however, they are not. 
Civil contemnors do not receive the same constitutional protections as 
criminal contemnors. 117 Yet civil contempt retains an undeniably puni-
tive aspect; after all, civil and criminal contemnors go to the same jails. 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged as much: "Contempts are 
neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal."118 Endeavoring nonetheless 
to draw a distinction, the Court stated: 
It is not the fact of punishment, but rather its character and purpose, 
that often serve to distinguish between the two classes of cases. If it is 
for civil contempt the punishment is remedial, and for the benefit of 
the complainant. But if it is for criminal contempt the sentence is 
punitive, to vindicate the authority of the court.59 
So far, so good; but if the matter could be disposed of that easily, it 
would not be in the Court. Some contemnors face remedial and puni-
tive measures simultaneously: "It is true that punishment by imprison-
ment may be remedial as well as punitive, and many civil contempt 
proceedings have resulted not only in the imposition of a fine, payable 
to the complainant, but also in committing the defendant to prison."60 
However, the Court viewed the conflict as more apparent than real. 
Incarceration for civil contempt may look punitive, but it is actually 
remedial. 
[I]mprisonment for civil contempt is ordered where the defendant has 
refused to do an affirmative act required by the provisions of an order 
. . . mandatory in its character. Imprisonment in such cases is not 
inflicted as a punishment, but is intended to be remedial by coercing 
the defendant to do what he had refused to do. The decree in such 
cases is that the defendant stand committed unless and until he per-
forms the affirmative act required by the court's order.61 
56. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. at 189 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). 
57. Srr infra section 11-C of this article. 
58. Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. 418,441 (1911). 
59. /d. 
60. !d. at 441-42. 
61. !d. at 442. 
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In other words, a civil contemnor is not being punished, but persuaded. 
The court fines or imprisons her not to penalize her for past miscon-
duct, but to coerce present or future compliance with its order for the 
benefit of the other party. The court gives the recalcitrant contemnor 
the choice of obeying its order or suffering a penalty which continues 
until she relents. 
Thus, refusal "to do an act commanded," if "remedied by impris-
onment until the party performs the required act," is civil contempt; 
"doing an act forbidden," if "punished by imprisonment for a definite 
term," is criminal contempt.62 The Court found this distinction "sound 
in principle," and claimed that it "generally, if not universally, affords 
a test by which to determine the character of the punishment."63 
Unfortunately the test has not proven satisfactory because it relies 
more on the nature of the punishment than on the nature of the con-
duct. Particular conduct can still constitute both civil and criminal con-
tempt,64 and the "blurred distinction" between civil and criminal con-
tempt causes "considerable confusion."6~ The Court tried 
unsuccessfully to clarify the distinction and eliminate the confusion in 
Hicks ex rel. Feiock v. Feiock,66 its "first modern attempt ... to enun-
ciate a useful test that courts can apply uniformly."67 Under Hicks, 
"the character of the relief that the proceeding will afford" determines 
the kind of contempt committed and thus the kind of protections re-
quired; "criminal penalties may not be imposed on someone who has 
not been afforded the protections that the Constitution requires 
.... "
68 Imprisonment is punitive (criminal) if for a fixed term, reme-
dial (civil) if it lasts only until the contemnor obeys the order. A fine is 
punitive if paid to the court, remedial if paid to the complainant or if 
avoidable upon compliance with the order.69 Under this basically circu-
lar analysis, the type of procedure required depends on the sanction 
imposed-but imposition of the sanction comes at the end of the pro-
ceeding.70 The Court puts the cart before the horse. 
62. !d. at 443. 
63. !d. 
64. Sr< United States v. United Mine Workers of Am., 330 U.S. 258. 299 ( 1947) 
65. :\1ascolo, Pmrrdural Dur ProCP.,·s and thr Rra.\Onoblt Doubt Struulard Of Proof In 
Cn•il Contnnpt ProrNdmgs, 14 NEw ENG.]. ON CRIM. & C1v. CoNFINFMFNT 245, 253 (19~8). 
66. 485 C.S 624 (1988) 
67. Note, },fodrm Diltii\SIOII of 11 Vrnrmblr Powrr: Cil•il Vn111.1 Crinnnol Co11/nnpt owl 
its Rolr In Child SujJJHn/ Enforrfllll'llt: I-I irks v. Feiock, 22 CJuuarroN L. K~.v. 1 r,3 (198H). 
68. Hirk1, 485 U.S. at 631-32. 
69. !d. at 633. 
70. Srr, r.g., Martineau, CoutflnjJI of Court: Eliminating the Con(1111011 Btili'l'fll Ci<•il o11rl 
Criminal Contrmpt, SOU. CJN. L. REv. 677, 683-84 (1981). 
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II. THE DANGERS oF ExERCISING CoNTEMPT PowERS 
In summary, federal and state statutes define disobedient and con-
tumacious conduct in extremely broad terms and grant the courts virtu-
ally unbridled discretion to punish it. Even so, courts claim an inherent 
and independent contempt power immune from legislative control. This 
"potent weapon" 71 originated not from the people, through constitu-
tional or legislative processes, but from the authority of the king. Well 
did Justice Black characterize this power as an "anomaly."72 Civil con-
temnors are particularly vulnerable, since they do not receive the same 
due process protections as criminal contemnors. Moreover, to make 
their theoretically nonpunitive penalty persuasive, their imprisonment 
or fine is indefinite, enduring until they submit. These facts raise 
troubling questions about a judge's ability to abuse the contempt power. 
A.. ExamjJlrs of Qurstionablr Usr of thr Contempt Power 
The contempt power's dangers are not merely hypothetical. Most 
practicing attorneys have a favorite story regarding the contempt power 
in the hands of a short-fused judge. For example, during a trial in the 
Common Pleas Court in Philadelphia, the judge ruled against the assis-
tant district attorney. "I don't believe this," the attorney made the mis-
take of saying. The judge promptly put her in custody and fined her 
$1,000. 73 
Criminal defendants are not the only ones subject to the judge's 
wrath. Spectators have also been held in contempt for trivial offenses 
such as failing to rise for the judge.74 More than one thin-skinned judge 
has held individuals in contempt for insulting the judge out of his pres-
ence.71; One can imagine, then, the reaction when a contemnor insults 
71. International Longshoremen's Ass'n v. Philadelphia Marine Trade Ass'n, 389 U.S. 64, 
76 11967) 
72. Gn·cn v. Cnited States, 356 U.S. at 193 (Black,]., dissenting). 
73. Sht Wr1.1n't Showing ConlnnjJt-Shf Was Trying Hrr Bfst to Conceal It, STUDENT 
LAw., Sepi 1984, at 13. 
74. /11 rp Chase, 468 F.2d 128 (7th Cir. 1972) (criminal defendant; an excellent dissent 
questions the appropriateness of the contempt conviction); United States v. Abascal, 509 F.2d 752 
(9th Cir.). 11'1"1. dmifd, 422 U.S. 1027 (1975) (criminal defendant; served two weeks of a 90-day 
contempt sentence); United States fX rfl. Robson v. Malone, 412 F.2d 848 (7th Cir. 1969) (two 
spectators held in contempt; court of appeals upheld the finding of contempt but said that the 2.5 
and 4 hours, respertively, which contemnors had already spent in custody was punishment 
enough). Srr gmrrallv Annotation, Failure to Rise in Fedfral Courtroom liS Constituting Crimi-
uol Contempt. 27 A.L.R. FF.D. 915 (1976). 
75. Brutkiewicz v. State, 280 Ala. 218, 191 So. 2d 222 (1966) (assistant district attorney 
uttered profanity against a circuit court judge when the court was in recess and the judge had left 
the courtroom), Boydstun v. State, 259 So. 2d 707 (Miss. 1972) (an unidentified person asked the 
jud~e's opponent in the election, who was standing in a hallway outside the courtroom, what was 
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the judge in his presence. 76 
While such cases may seem as unthreatening as they are amusing, 
they illustrate the genuine dangers of the contempt power. Other cases 
have been more serious. In one, a civil rights activist was sentenced to 
four months in jail by a state trial judge who had become personally 
involved in the proceeding. 77 In the not-too-distant past, courts rou-
tinely used their contempt power to muzzle the press, notwithstanding 
the first amendment.78 Warning reporters of the dangers of contempt 
has kept some authors collecting royalties through several editions.79 
Earlier in this century, organized labor bore the brunt of the contempt 
power.80 Although classes of contemnors have changed, the nature of 
the power has not. 
B. The Likelihood of judicial Bias 
Some contemnors invite, and indeed merit, abuse of the court's dis-
cretion. One such individual was a criminal defendant named Richard 




You will get a fair trial. 
It doesn't appear that I am going to get one 
the way you are overruling all our motions 
and that, and being like a hatchet man for 
the State. 
happening inside; for replying "Everything but justice," the judge's opponent was convicted of 
constructive contempt). These and similar cases are reported in Annotation, Oral Co>nmunimtions 
Insulting to Particular State judge, Made to Third Party Out ofJudgr', Phniml Presence, ns 
Criminal Contempt, 30 A.L.R. 4TH 155 (1984). 
76. Sn, e.g., Losavio v. District Court, 182 Colo. 180, 512 P.2d 266 (1973) (district attorney 
told probation officer, "it must be nice to have him in your corner;" although the judge didn't hear 
the remark, the probation officer immediately informed the judge, and the court summarily used 
its contempt power); In re Buckley, 10 Cal. 3d 237, 110 Cal. Rptr. 121 (1973), rnt. denied, 418 
U.S. 910 (1974) (the statement "[t]his court obviously doesn't want to apply the law" resulted in 
five days in jail and a $500 fine; upheld on appeal. The court distinguished the case from In re 
Little, 404 U.S. 553 (1972), in which the Supreme Court overturned the contempt conviction of a 
petitioner who called the court biased and said that it had prejudged his case.). Ser gnurally 
Annotation, Attonuy's Addressing Allegedly Insulting Remarks to Court During Course of Trial 
as ContnnjJt, 68 A.L.R. 3D 273 (1976). For some especially amusing examples, see Kilgarlin and 
Ozmun, Contempt of Court in Texas-What You Shouldn't Sny to the .Judge, 38 BAYLOR L. 
REV. 291' 326-28 (1986). 
77. Johnson v. Mississippi, 403 U.S. 212 (1971). 
78. R. GOLDFARB, supra note II, at 7; see also L. YANKWICH, IT's LIBEL OR CoNTEMPT 
IF You PRINT IT (1950). 
79. See, e.g., P. AsHLEY, SAY IT SAFELY: LEGAL LIMITS IN PususHING, RADIO, AND TEL-
EVISION (5th ed. 1976). 
80. Sn, e.g., Gompers v. Buck's Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S. at 442; United States v. 



















This side bar is over. 
Wait a minute, Your Honor. 
It is over. 
You dirty sonofabitch. 
Are you trying to protect the prison authori-
ties, Your Honor? Is that your reason? 
You are out of order, Mr. Codispoti. I don't 
want any outbursts like that again. This is a 
court of justice. You don't know how to ask 
questions. 
Possibly Your Honor doesn't know how to 
rule on them. 
You keep quiet. 
You ought to be Gilbert and Sullivan the 
way you sustain the district attorney every 
time he objects to the questions. 
Are you through? 
Now, I'm going to produce my defense in this 
case and not be railroaded into any life sen-
tence by any dirty, tyrannical old dog like 
yourself. 
I ask Your Honor to keep your mouth shut 
while I'm questioning my own witness. Will 
you do that for me? 
You're a judge first. What are you working 
for? The prison authorities, you bum? 
I have a motion pending before Your Honor. 
I would suggest-
Go to hell. I don't give a good God damn 
what you suggest, you stumbling dog.81 
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Not surprisingly, the jury returned a guilty verdict. Prior to imposing 
sentence on the verdict, the judge sentenced Mr. Mayberry to eleven to 
twenty-two years for various criminal contempts.82 The Supreme Court 
vacated and remanded, concluding that the Due Process Clause of the 
fourteenth amendment required that Mayberry receive a public trial 
"before a judge other than the one reviled."83 Curiously, the Court sug-
gested that the judge should have punished the contempts immediately 
81. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455, 456-58 ( 1971 ). 
82. /d. Mr. Mayberry's reaction is not recorded. 
83. /d. 
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and summarily.84 Evidently the Due Process Clause more easily per-
mits punishment in the heat of the moment than upon sober reflection. 
Sometimes the judge, rather than the defendant or counsel, needs 




Motion denied. Proceed. 
I object to Your Honor yelling at me and raising 
your voice like that. 
Just a moment. If you say another word I will 
have the Marshal stick a gag in your mouth.86 
The trial record from which the above exchange was taken revealed 
numerous manifestations of "an attitude which hardly reflected the re-
straints of conventional judicial demeanor."86 The Supreme Court re-
versed Offutt's conviction of contempt and remanded the case for hear-
ing before a different judge because the original judge had "become 
personally embroiled."87 
The magnitude of a contempt sentence may indicate that a judge 
has become too personally involved.88 The judge should recuse herself if 
her bias would preclude an impartial hearing.89 In general, however, 
we must hope that judges are capable of dealing fairly with criticism, 
because a judge who is subjected to disrespect is not necessarily disqual-
ified.90 In fact, instant summary punishment of direct contempt, even if 
it emotionally involves the judge, is still allowed. 91 Recusal is permissi-
ble but certainly not required: 
The judge must banish the slightest personal impulse to reprisal, but 
he should not bend backward and injure the authority of the court by 
too great leniency. The substitution of another judge ... is not al-
84. !d. at 463-64. But IW Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488, 497-99 (1974). 
85. Offutt v. United States, 348 U.S. 11, 16 n.2 (1954). 
86. !d. at 12. 
87. !d. at 17. A crotchety Justice Minton dissented, arguing that the contemnor in this "pid-
dling case" had been found guilty and that his punishment (two days) was suitable. Irl. at 18. 
88. Taylor v. Hayes, 418 U.S. 488 (1974) (four-and-a-half year sentence). 
89. Annotation, Dur Proass Clausr of Fourtnnth A.mrndmn!l "' Rrquiring Dllquaiifiw-
tion of Stair or Local judgr From Participation in Particular Liligation-Supmnr Court Casrs, 
89 L. En. 2o 1066 (1988); Annotation, Disqualzfiration of judgr in Stair Procnding.1 to Punish 
Contnnpt Against or hwoh•ing Himsrlj in Opm Court and in His A.rtunl Prrsma, 37 A.L.R. 
4TH 1004 (1985); Annotation, Disqualifirntion of judgr in Proardings to Pu ni.1h Contnnpt 
Again1/ or Im•oh•ing Himsrlf or Court of Which Hr Is a Mrmhrr, 64 A.L.R. 2n 600 (1959). 
90. Sacher v. United States, 343 U.S. 1, rrh'g dn1ird, 343 U.S. 931 (1952); Ungar v. 
Sarafite, 376 U.S. 575, rrh'g dmird, 377 U.S. 925 (1964); cf Annotation, Construrtirm of ProJ'l-
sion in Frdrral Criminal Procrdurr Rulr 42(b) That if Contnnpt Chargrs lm•oh•r Di.1rnprrt to 
or Critiri.1111 of Judgr, Hr is Di.1qualijird From Prrsiding at Trial or Hraring Exrrpt With Dr-
fi>ndr/11(.1 Co11.1mt, 3 A.L.R. FED. 420 (1970). 
91. Mayberry v. Pennsylvania, 400 U.S. 455 (1971). 
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ways possible. . [W]here conditions do not make it impracticable, 
or where the delay may not injure public or private right, a judge, 
called upon to act in a case of contempt by personal attack upon him, 
may, without flinching from his duty, properly ask that one of his 
fellow judges take his place. 92 
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The Supreme Court has stated that courts should "be on guard 
against confusing offenses to their sensibilities with obstruction to the 
administration of justice."93 That is easier said than done. Even judges 
are human; contumacious conduct directed against them inevitably 
breeds resentment. Impartiality may be an unrealistic goal for a judge 
who becomes, in effect, a party to the case. Yet in most contempt pro-
ceedings, the very judge against whom the contempt was committed acts 
as accuser, lawmaker, prosecutor, judge, jury, and disciplinarian. 94 
Other offenses are "referred to an independent fact finding tribunal, so 
that the human emotions of vindictiveness or resentment might play no 
part in the consideration of the question of guilt."911 But contempt is 
different. 
"Since the judge has been given the authority to control all the 
other participants in the court, there is no one immediately available to 
control him if he acts improperly or arbitrarily."96 Appellate courts, 
therefore, bear "special responsibility for determining that the power is 
not abused, to be exercised if necessary by revising themselves the 
sentences imposed."97 Appellate review, however, is not a sufficient 
check against judicial bias. Courts of appeal tend to treat trial court 
contempt convictions with great deference. For example, the ninth cir-
cuit does not consider whether the alleged contemnor's conduct was 
truly contemptuous; it merely asks whether the judge has abused her 
discretion98-which discretion, as we have seen, is broad indeed. "His-
tory is philosophy teaching by example. From what judges have at-
tempted and have done in times past ... we may draw some pretty 
shrewd conclusions as to what, if unchecked, they may attempt, and 
92. Cooke v. United States, 267 U.S. 517, 539 (1925). 
93. Brown v. United States, 356 U.S. 148, 153 (1958). 
94. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. at 198 (Black, J., dissenting). The same is true in 
Canada: "[T]here is nothing in the existing law to prevent the judge, at whom the contempt was 
directed, from presiding over the determination of the accused contemnor's guilt." R. Martin, 
Srl'nnl Strps Bnrkwnrd: The Lau• Rrfonn Commission of Canada and ContnnfJl of Court, 21 U. 
OF W. ONTARIO L. REV., 307, 310 (1983). 
95. E. DANGEL., supra note 35, at 19b. 
96. N. DoRSEN & L. fRIEDMAN, DISORDER IN THE COURT; REPORT OF THE AssoCIATION 
OF THE BAR OF THE CITY OF NEW YoRK, SPECIAL COMMITTEE ON CoURTROOM CONDUCT 205 
(1973). 
97. Green v. United States, 356 U.S. at 188. 
98. In rr Gustafson, 650 F.2d 1017, 1021-22 (9th Cir. 1981). 
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may do, in times present."99 
The great majority of judges are individuals of restraint and bal-
ance. But relying on human nature is a poor substitute for procedural 
protections. Unfortunately, such protections are lacking. 
C. Absence of Protections 
The Constitution provides significant procedural protections to 
criminal defendants. 
The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall 
be by Jury .... 100 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed ... and to be informed 
of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the 
witnesses against him; to have the compulsory process for obtaining 
witnesses in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his 
defence. 101 
Excessive bail shall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, 
nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted. 102 
These protections apply partially to criminal contempt but do not apply 
at all to civil contempt. 
As previously noted, statutory definitions of contempt are broad 
and vague, and judicial definitions are broader. It is difficult to deter-
mine in advance precisely what conduct will be held to constitute con-
tempt. Even so, punishment for contumacious conduct can be severe. 
For example, one can be imprisoned for disobeying a court order to 
comply with a certain statute even if the statute itself does not authorize 
imprisonment for its violation. 103 Under the Federal Rules of Criminal 
Procedure a judge may punish contempts which he sees or hears, or 
which occur in his presence, summarily and immediately. 104 In other 
instances the criminal contemnor must be afforded notice and a 
hearing. 1011 
99. j. CAMPBELL, RICHARD HILDRETH, ED., ATROCIOUS jUDCES, LIVES OF jVDGES INFA-
MOUS AS TooLS OF TYRANTS AND INSTRUMENTS OF OPPRESSION, /ntror/urtion 35 (Hildreth, 
ed. 1856) 
I 00. U.S. CoN ST. art. Ill, § 2, cl. 3. 
101. U.S. CoNST. amend. VI. 
102. U.S. CoNST. amend. VIII. 
103. Annotation, Proprirty of!mpri.lonmmt Unrlrr 18 USCS Sntiou 40!(3)/nr Cnntrmpt of 
Court Ordn Rrquiring Complianrr With Statutr Not Authorizing lmpri.IO!llllmt for its Viola-
tion, 41 A.L.R. Fm. 900 ( 1979). 
104. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(a). 
105. FED. R. CRIM. P. 42(b); srr also Annotation, Suprnnt Court's Virws as to Right In 
Trial by jury in Contrmpt Prorrrdings, 45 L. En. 2n 815 (1976). 
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For decades the Supreme Court insisted that no right of trial by 
jury attached to proceedings for contempt. The Due Process Clause 
was held inapplicable. 106 In 1968, however, the Court determined that 
serious criminal contempts, meaning those punished by over six 
months' incarceration, were crimes in every fundamental respect; thus 
the jury trial provisions of the Constitution applied. 107 
[I)n terms of those considerations which make the right to jury trial 
fundamental in criminal cases, there is no substantial difference be-
tween serious contempts and other serious crimes. Indeed, in contempt 
cases an even more compelling argument can be made for providing a 
right to jury trial as a protection against the arbitrary exercise of offi-
cial power. 108 
Criminal contemnors have long received other constitutional protections 
as well. They are presumed innocent; their guilt must be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt; they need not testify against themselves; they 
receive notice of the charges against them and an opportunity to re-
spond; they may employ counsel; they may call witnesses; and they 
have the right to a public trial at which an unbiased judge presides. 109 
Civil contemnors lack most of these protections. They need not re-
ceive an indictment or jury trial.no Their guilt need not be proven be-
yond a reasonable doubt.n 1 When a lesser standard of proof applies, 
the civil contemnor's "incarceration hinges on ... a standard of proof 
that does not satisfy criminal due process requirements."112 Moreover, 
since "an indeterminate sentence is ordinarily imposed," a civil contem-
nor "can theoretically remain in jail as long as he obdurately refuses to 
promise to behave." 113 Although the contemnor "is entitled to a due 
process hearing, the constitutional and procedural protections for de-
fendants in criminal trials, even the lesser requirements for criminal 
contempt, are not constitutionally required in civil contempt."114 As 
106. Srr, r.p;., Eilenbecker v. District Court, 134 U.S. 31, 36 (1890); Interstate Commerce 
Comm'n v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447,489 (1894); Gompers v. United States, 233 U.S. 604,610-11 
(1914); Green v. United States, 356 U.S. 165, 183-87 (1958). 
l 07 Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 198 (1968). 
I 08. !d. at 202. 
109. !d. at 205. 
110. Shillitani v. t:nited States, 384 U.S. 364, 365 (1966); Universal City Studios, Inc. v. 
i\'ew York Broadway Int'l Corp., 705 F.2d 94, 97 (2d Cir. 1983). 
Ill :\t present three different standards of proof are used in civil contempt cases: preponder-
ance of the el'idenu·. clear and convincing evidence, and beyond a reasonable doubt. l'vfascolo, 
Pro(l'dtaal Dul' Proass 11nd thr Rrasrmablr Doubt Standard 0{ Proof In Ci1•il Crmtnnpt Pro-
anhngs, 14 Nt.w f.Nt;. J. ON CRIM. & CIV. CONFINEMENT 245, 260-62 (1988). 
112. !d. at 281 
113. N. DoRSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, sujua note 96, at 104. 
114. !d. 
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long as the judge believes that continued imprisonment retains some 
possibility of coercing compliance, the civil contemnor can be incarcer-
ated indefinitely. In such a circumstance, the artificial distinction be-
tween punitive incarceration for criminal contempt and remedial or co-
ercive incarceration for civil contempt becomes meaningless. A civil 
contemnor with a principled reason for disobedience may end up being 
subjected to a much harsher penalty than a criminal contemnor. 
Of course courts need the ability to maintain order in their pro-
ceedings and to enforce their judgments. The contempt power is proba-
bly the most practical means to these ends. But since civil contemnors 
lack many of the protections extended to criminal contemnors and other 
criminal defendants, the civil contempt power must be exercised with 
temperance and moderation. It clearly permits judicial abuse; thus, 
given the civil contemnor's unlimited penalties, any abuse constitutes a 
serious threat to her property and liberty. 
Suppose a party were ordered to take an action she found so mor-
ally repugnant that she simply could not comply. Contrary to the 
cliche, such a contemnor would not have the "jailhouse keys in her own 
hands." 1111 Compliance would not be a realistic option for her. Suppose 
further that the contemnor is a party to a bitter divorce. The court has 
awarded custody of the couple's five-year-old girl to the mother but has 
given unsupervised visitation rights to the father. The girl has displayed 
both physical and psychological symptoms of sexual abuse. The father 
heatedly denies any misconduct, but significant evidence points to him 
as the abuser. Some of this evidence is excluded from court; the remain-
der is insufficient to meet legal standards of proof. Unpersuaded, the 
judge orders the mother to produce the child and allow an unsupervised 
two-week visitation. 
Under such circumstances, would any mother worthy of the title 
produce her child? 
Would any court worthy of the title keep her in prison for over 
two years for refusing to do so? 
III. AN ILLUSTRATION: THE ELIZABETH MoRGAN CAsE 
A. Background 
Educated at Harvard, Yale, and Oxford, a successful plastic sur-
geon with a flourishing practice, author of four books and numerous 
columns, Dr. Jean Elizabeth Morgan shared a Washington, D.C., jail 
with drug dealers, prostitutes, and street criminals for two years and 
one month. Never convicted of or even charged with a crime, she was 
115. In rr Nevitt, 117 F.2d 448, 461 (8th Cir. 1902). 
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imprisoned for civil contempt. Her offense: refusing to produce her 
five-year-old daughter Hilary. District of Columbia Superior Court 
Judge Herbert B. Dixon, Jr., had awarded Hilary's father two weeks 
of unsupervised visitation. Morgan refused to allow it because, she al-
leged, the father had repeatedly subjected Hilary to sexual abuse. 
Rather than expose her daughter to the danger of more, Morgan sent 
Hilary into hiding and then went to jail while a $5,000-per-day fine 
mounted. Along with her liberty, Morgan lost her medical practice and 
her home. It took an Act of Congress to secure her release. 
In January 1982, Dr. Morgan flew to Haiti with Dr. Eric A. 
Foretich, an oral surgeon from McLean, Virginia. There Foretich ob-
tained a Haitian divorce from his second wife and married Morgan, his 
third. Seven months later, Morgan left him; like his second wife, she 
accused him of ill temper and violence. On August 21, 1982, a week 
after their separation, Morgan gave birth to Hilary. In November, 
1982, she got a Haitian divorce. The following spring Morgan and 
Foretich sued each other for custody of Hilary in the District of Co-
lumbia Superior Court. 116 Thus began a legal battle of remarkable 
breadth, expense, and acrimony. Within five years, their file had be-
come the largest the District of Columbia Court of Appeals had ever 
seen in a custody case,117 and their legal bills had totaled over $2 
million. 118 
In November 1983, the court awarded custody to Morgan and vis-
itation rights to Foretich.U 9 What happened thereafter is, to put it 
mildly, a matter of some dispute. According to Foretich: 
From the age of one month she [Hilary] was placed in day care until 
well into the evening. At six months, she was taken to a psychiatrist 
to shore up her mother's contention that a young child should have no 
independent visitation with her father. Since then, her mother has 
taken her to a succession of therapists in an endeavor to find a profes-
sional to assist in her goal of limiting my role in Hilary's life. 120 
Why would Morgan want to do that? "She flat-out used me. I was 
nothing more than a sperm bank to her. I was discardable."121 
~1organ, on the other hand, accused Foretich and his parents of 
sexually abusing Hilary almost from infancy. 122 Strong evidence sup-
116. Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at A1, col. 1. 
117. Washington Post, Aug. 28, 1988, at C6, col. 4. Morgan's attorney said it lookFd more 
like a file for a federal antitrust action. /d. 
118. Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at A1, col. 1. 
119. /d. 
120. Foretich, My Daup;htrr Hilary, Washington Post, April 30, 1989, at C8, col. 2. 
121. Inquiry, USA Today, July 24, 1989, at 12A, coL 1. 
122. Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1987, at C6, coL 1. 
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ported her accusation. 123 The United States Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit declared: "There appears to be little doubt but that Hil-
ary has been subjected to a startling condition. Testimony of the doctors 
and other witnesses was sufficient to justify a finding that Hilary has 
been sexually abused." 124 Hilary demonstrated both physical and psy-
chological symptoms of abuse, including suicidal tendencies. In a letter 
to Foretich dated May 27, 1987, Mary L. Froning, Psy.D., of the 
Chesapeake lnstitute-Hilary's psychotherapist for the twenty months 
preceding her hiding-wrote: 
It is my opinion that Hilary is currently suicidal because she believes 
she is worthless. This feeling of worthlessness is based on the fact that 
although she has told many people that she was sexually abused by 
her father and that she does not want to have visits with her father, 
she has been continually forced into visits which she considers fright-
ening situations. 125 
Hilary also displayed other psychological symptoms of abuse. The 
Washington Post reported that Hilary had been recorded on videotape 
"talk[ing] repeatedly about grilling and eating her baby doll. 'Turn the 
burner on her,' she instructed her mother." 126 When told after a hiatus 
that paternal visits would resume, Hilary reportedly shrieked and be-
gan sobbing. 127 Morgan's fiance, Judge Paul R. Michel, testified before 
Judge Dixon that he had helped drive Hilary to the court-ordered vis-
its. "I counseled her to obey the orders of this court," he said, "and I 
don't regret anything more than doing that." 128 Judge Michel would 
not lightly advocate disobedience of a court order; he sits on the United 
States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. 129 
Foretich's public statements did little to help his cause. Respond-
ing to the charge that numerous specialists had diagnosed sexual abuse, 
Foretich claimed that Morgan's expert witnesses were "complete, utter 
phonies or they're incompetent. She picked the bottom of the barrel."130 
Actually, eleven individuals (including a psychologist, a gynecologist, a 
pediatrician, and a police officer) diagnosed Hilary as sexually 
abused. 131 Unlike Foretich, the United States Court of Appeals for the 
123. Srr Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941, 942-46 (4th Cir. 1988). 
124. /d. at 947. 
125. 135 CON<;. Rt:c. S10814 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Senator Armstrone;); Iff 
also N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1987, at AI, col. 5. 
126. Washington Post, April 25, 1988. at A 1, col. 1. 
127. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1987, at AI, col. 5. 
128. Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1988, at Dl, col. 2. 
129. /d. 
130. Inquiry, USA Today, July 24, 1989, at 12A, col. 1. 
131. 135 CoN G. Rn;. Sl 0815 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Senator Armstrong). 
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Fourth Circuit considered these specialists competent to testify. 132 One 
was Dr. Dennis Harrison, "who had been qualified as an expert in 
psychology and child abuse and who had spent over one hundred hours 
examining and working with Hilary Foretich."133 Another was Dr. 
Charles Shubin, "a pediatrician who was qualified as an expert in the 
field of child sexual abuse. " 134 
Heather, Foretich's daughter by his second wife, sustained injuries 
similar to Hilary's. To the concerns about those injuries, Foretich re-
plied that his second wife had "been trying to brainwash Heather."135 
Again, the fourth circuit had a different opinion: 
At trial, plaintiffs [Dr. Morgan and Hilary] sought to introduce testi-
mony by Dr. Charles Shubin . . . . Dr. Shubin . . . was prepared to 
testify that both girls had suffered sexual injuries and that the mecha-
nism of injury was essentially the same in both cases. Plaintiffs also 
had numerous other professionals and lay witnesses who were pre-
pared to testify that Heather had been sexually abused during visita-
tion periods with the defendants. 136 
The fourth circuit held that the district court abused its discretion by 
excluding evidence of Heather's abuse. 137 Not only was this evidence 
admissible, it was "highly relevant to disputed issues in this case. " 138 
Indeed, it was 
essential in that it tended to identify the defendants as the perpetra-
tors of the crime against Hilary since only the defendants had access 
to both girls. No other piece of evidence could have had a comparable 
probative impact as to the identity of Hilary's assailants. This evi-
dence also negated several defenses raised by the defendants: Hilary's 
injuries were caused by Dr. Morgan; were fabricated by Dr. Morgan; 
or were caused by self-infliction. 139 
Thus, Morgan seemed to have ample ground for suspicion. 
On the other hand, Foretich, whom even a sympathetic columnist 
identified as "clearly a mess of a man," maintained his innocence and 
passed several lie detector tests. 140 One of three psychologists who ex-
amined Foretich said that his test results suggested "sexual ideation 
132. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d at 943-44. 
133. /d. at 948. 
134. !d. at 943. 
135. Inquiry, USA Today, July 24, 1989, at 12A, col. I. 
136. Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d at 943-44. 
137. /d. at 942. 
138. /d. at 944. 
139. /d. 
140. J1orr;anri/l( .V!arriar;r, TRB From Washington, The New Republic, July 31, 1989, at 
4. 
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with young girls," but the other two found no problems. 141 Judge 
Dixon found that Hilary enjoyed her visits with Foretich,142 and im-
plicitly accused Morgan not only of inconsistency in her testimony but 
also of going to any length and indulging in theatrics. 143 Morgan ap~ 
peared to have an agenda beyond protecting Hilary. She had written, 
"I am utterly convinced that when a little child is taken from its loving 
mother, even for visitation, it may lose its natural protector and its se-
curity. Men are all very well, but nature didn't make men for rearing 
little children."144 Morgan also accused Foretich of offenses other than 
child abuse, including drug dealing; unproven, these only drew atten-
tion to inconsistencies in her own story-which she had paid a media 
consultant to publicize. 145 
In federal court, neither party won suits accusing the other of 
abuse. Morgan won on appeal-the Fourth Circuit instructed the dis-
. trict court to admit the evidence discussed above-but the case could 
not proceed without Hilary, whose return Morgan would not risk. 146 
In the District of Columbia Superior Court, Morgan retained custody, 
but Foretich retained his rights to visitation. The proceedings were al-
most as mysterious as they were voluminous. Noting that Morgan had 
been sent to jail without a public hearing, the New York Times com-
plained that it was "impossible to detail all the charges, since the case 
is currently under seal and reporters have been barred from the court-
room."147 "Because the proceedings have been closed," said Stephen H. 
Sachs, the former attorney general of Maryland, who represented Mor-
gan, "the public cannot know the strength of Elizabeth Morgan's 
case." 148 Of course, the public could not know the strength of Foretich's 
defense either. 
Thus it is hard to know which party-if either-is telling the 
truth. But two things are certain: first, Hilary strenuously resisted go-
ing to her father; second, she showed clear signs of sexual abuse. 
Judge Dixon held a hearing on Morgan's allegations of sexual 
abuse in November 1985. In August 1986, he held another hearing 
which lasted twelve days and ended with Morgan going to jail. After 
141. Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at AI, col. I. 
142. Washington Post, Aug. 29, 1987, at B3, col. I. 
143. Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at AI, col. I. 
144. From the last chapter of her book CusTODY, quoted in the Washington Post, April 25, 
1988, at A1, col. I. 
145. Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at A 1, col. I. 
146. Sn Morgan v. Foretich, 846 F.2d 941. 
147. N.Y. Times, Nov. 14, 1987 at A1, col. 5; ve also Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1987, at 
C6, col. 1. 
148. Washington Post, Aug. 29, 1987, at B3, col. I. 
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three days the District of Columbia Court of Appeals ordered her re-
lease. In February 1987, she went to jail again; again she was released 
after three days, agreeing to allow supervised visits. 149 In April 1987, 
Judge Dixon ordered unsupervised weekend visits. Hilary went; Mor-
gan alleged that she was abused again. Hilary's court-appointed guard-
ian, attorney Linda Holman, stated that the child's mental and emo-
tional health was jeopardized.150 On July 16, 1987, Hilary's therapist 
wrote: 
Dear Dr. Morgan: 
I am writing to you to express my concern over Hilary's continu-
ing to be compelled to undergo unsupervised visits with her father. I 
am fully aware of the legal issues that you face should you not com-
ply with Court-ordered visitation. However, in my role as Hilary's 
therapist, I must reiterate my position that for her physical and emo-
tional safety she should not be continually placed in the jeopardy that 
these visits place her. 
Hilary's emotional health has suffered tremendously in recent 
weeks, but particularly since her disclosure to Detective Williams of 
recent abuse. This is understandable given the fact that not only did 
that not protect her but has now exposed her to even more abuse 
because of her father's anger for the perceived betrayal .... 
I understand that you have attempted to remain neutral concern-
ing the visits and Hilary's father's abusive behavior toward her. 
However, this too is having a bad effect on Hilary, who has become 
even more hopeless and depressed as her feelings remain unvalidated 
by you .... 
I empathize with the dilemma you face to meet both your legal 
and maternal responsibilities. I just wanted to make clear the risks for 
Hilary. 
Sincerely, 
Mary L. Froning, Psy.D., 
Staff Psychologist. 161 
In August 1987, Judge Dixon ordered an unsupervised two-week 
visit. 152 There Morgan drew the line. 
149. Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at AI, col. I; Lewis, The Limits of Law, N.Y. Times, 
Dec. 22, 1988, at A23, col. I; Morgan v. Foretich, 521 A.2d 248 (D.C. 1987); Morgan v. Fore-
tich, 528 A.2d 425 (D C 1987). 
150. Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at A I, col. I. 
151. The entire letter is reprinted in 135 CoNG. REC. SI0815 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) 
(statement of Senator Armstrong). 
152. Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1987, at C6, col. I; Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at AI, 
col. I. 
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B. Finding of Contempt and Incarceration 
On August 26, 1987, in a partly closed hearing, Judge Dixon 
found Elizabeth Morgan in contempt for failing to obey his August 21 
order to produce Hilary. He imposed a fine of $5,000 per day and 
sentenced her to prison until she complied. 163 On August 28, 1987, 
Morgan appeared again before Judge Dixon. She did not wish to break 
the law, her attorney argued, but she had to protect her daughter; she 
was convinced that further unsupervised visits would result in further 
abuse. The judge stated that the issue of visitation had already been 
decided and asked where Hilary was. "I'm not going to answer that," 
Morgan calmly replied. 164 Judge Dixon then instructed the District of 
Columbia police to find Hilary, after which the U.S. Marshals took 
Morgan from the courtroom to the jail.166 The Supreme Court later 
denied an application for a stay. 166 
After five months, Morgan was still in jail, vowing to remain until 
Hilary turned eighteen, if necessary. 167 After eight months the Wash-
ington Post reported that a habeas corpus petition had proved unfruit-
ful, and "[ t]he stalemate, whose most obvious victim is the child, re-
mains unbroken." 168 Morgan likened herself to Galileo. "I know that I 
am right, and I know that I'm sane," she said. "I know that if the facts 
were known everybody would know it." 169 
After twelve months, Morgan's incarceration was reported to be 
the longest ever in such a case. 160 A Harvard law professor said she 
followed in the tradition of Gandhi and Martin Luther King. An un-
identified District of Columbia Superior Court judge said that the mere 
threat of jail usually coerced compliance; if not, a week or two in jail 
did the trick. But an entire year for civil contempt! Researchers said 
that most other long-term civil contemnors were Mafiosi and Puerto 
Rican radicals. Lawyers said that some courts had developed a rule of 
thumb that if incarceration for civil contempt hadn't worked after about 
six months, it wasn't going to work at all. Morgan said, "My surgical 
residency was a lot harder."161 And the second year of imprisonment 
153. Washington Post, Aug. 27, 1987, at C6, col. 1; Sff Morgan v. Foretich, 546 A.2d 407 
(D.C. 1988), rrrt. dmird, 109 S. Ct. 790 (1989), and Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1 (D.C. 
1989). 
154. Washington Post, Aug. 29, 1987, at B3, col. 1. 
155. /d. 
156. Morgan v. Foretich, 483 U.S. 1053 (1987). 
157. USA Today, Jan. 29, 1988, at 2A, col. 1. 
158. Washington Post, April 25, 1988, at AI, col. 1. 
159. /d. 
160. Washington Post, Aug. 28, 1988, at C 1, col. 1 (final ed.). 
161. !d. 
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began. 
After fourteen months, the Washington Post reported that the cus-
tody battle "has increasingly taken the character of a dispute between 
Morgan and the judge."162 Steve Sachs made an impassioned appeal 
before Judge Dixon: 
If 14 months doesn't slake the thirst for vindication, then I say to the 
court and I say to the corporation counsel ... 'Prosecute her. Prose-
cute her'' 
If Elizabeth Morgan is to be punished, let's do it the old-fash-
ioned way: with a trial and a jury of her peers and a presumption of 
innocence. 
Yes, vindicate the authority of the law. But there's a difference 
between vindication and vindictiveness. 163 
His argument was to no avail. 
After fifteen months, Morgan remained unbending. "I know that I 
have done the right thing," she said. 164 Appearing in court on Decem-
ber 13, 1988, for the first time since her imprisonment, she refused to 
compromise and refused to bring Hilary back. 1611 At a hearing the fol-
lowing day, all seemed to agree that if Morgan would never relent the 
coercion would be punitive and thus impermissible. "Analysts say that 
most defendants never test the outer limits of confinement under civil 
contempt," reported the Washington Post, "either because they submit 
to the court's authority or because their case becomes moot." 166 Morgan 
was testing-and arguably stretching-those limits. Foretich's attorney 
bristled at suggestions that Morgan had been denied due process, 
though, charging that she "blithely-blithely-[ threw] away the pre-
sumption of innocence" in accusing his client of sexual abuse. 167 
On December 15, 1988, Judge Dixon issued his ruling. This case 
has "tried my very existence and gnawed at me as a human being," he 
said, but "the coercion has only just begun"168-a phrase he uttered 
three times. 169 Judge Dixon emphasized that the imprisonment was in-
tended to enforce his order, not to punish Morgan for disobedience. 170 
"It is more probable than not that Dr. Morgan believes she can under-
mine court orders . . . by the mere allegation of such an offense as 
162. Washington Post, Nov. 2, 1988, at Dl, col. 1 (final ed.). 
163. !d. 
164. Washington Post, Dec. 14, 1988, at Dl, col. 2. 
165. lrl. 
166. Washington Post, Dec. 15, 1988, at B3, col. 1. 
167. !d. 
168. NY Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at D20, col. 4 (city ed.). 
169. Washington Post, Dec. 16, 1988, at AI, col. 1. 
170. NY Times, Dec. 16, 1988, at D20, col. 4 (city ed.). 
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repulsive as child abuse," the judge said. 171 He added, "It could be a 
month, it could be a year, it could be more than that" before he would 
be convinced that she would not relent. 172 Morgan prepared to spend a 
second consecutive Christmas in jail, "appear[ing) certain to exceed the 
sixteen months in jail that previously marked the record for civil con-
tempt of court in a reported case," said the Washington Post. 173 
Incidentally, that ruling followed the hearing at which Judge 
Michel testified. 174 Foretich responded to Judge Michel's poignant tes-
timony, characteristically, by filing a complaint charging him with offi-
cial misconduct. 1711 Morgan's attorneys, meanwhile, argued that because 
the custody and contempt hearings were held in secret, her due process 
rights had been violated. On January 9, 1989, the Supreme Court de-
clined to hear the matter. 176 
After Morgan had been in jail twenty months, Foretich publicly 
proposed a compromise. He asked to: 
1. See Elizabeth Morgan released from confinement. I would 
then drop my request ... for termination of her parental rights. 
2. Have Hilary hospitalized to ascertain her physical, emotional 
and psychiatric status. After this evaluation process, she would be 
placed in a foster home where both parents would have supervised 
visitation. 
3. Participate (as I stated before the D.C. Court of Appeals in 
April 1988) in a multi-disciplinary evaluation of all parties .... The 
members of this team could be picked by Hilary's attorney, or they 
could be selected by the American Psychiatric Association and/or the 
American Psychological Association. I would abide by their decision. 
4. Let Hilary's attorney appoint a well-credentialed and 
respected psychiatrist to review the records and testify to the present 
psychiatric state of Elizabeth Morgan, if she is no longer willing to 
participate in this approach. Hilary would be evaluated by a similarly 
competent child psychiatrist; if the child psychiatrist finds that it 
would be in Hilary's best interest that I give up visitation, I would do 
so, although it would be extremely painful to me. 177 
However, there were conditions. The proposal was ''[p]redicated upon 
Hilary's return and placement with the appropriate authorities."178 
17 L Washington Post, Dec. 16, 1988, at A 1, col. L 
172. !d. 
173. !d. 
174. 5ff supra notes 128-29 and accompanying text. 
175. Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1989, at D3, col. L 
176. Morgan v. Foretich, 109 S. Ct. 790 (1989); Washington Post, Jan. 10, 1989, at D3, col. 
1. 
177. Foretich, M)' Daughtn Hilary, Washington Post, April 30, 1989, at C8, col. 1. 
178. !d. 
239] CIVIL CONTEMPT 265 
Having endured twenty months in jail to keep Hilary awa)' from the 
authorities, Morgan was not about to turn her over to them on the 
basis of a promise from Foretich. On June 8, 1989, Morgan, Foretich, 
and the mediators met in a jury room. All emerged unscathed, but no 
resolution resul ted. 179 
After nearly twenty-one months, Sachs argued before a three-
judge panel of the District of Columbia Court of Appeals that since 
Morgan could never be forced into compliance, her incarceration was 
punitive and thus constitutionally impermissible.180 While that court's 
decision was pending, "[ t ]he stakes were raised dramatically . . . in the 
twenty-one month test of wills between Elizabeth Morgan and D.C. 
Superior Court Judge Herbert B. Dixon Jr. when Robert M. Morgan, 
an assistant U.S. attorney, joined his older sister in open defiance of the 
court."181 Judge Dixon asked Robert Morgan for the location of his 
parents, who disappeared the same month as Hilary. Robert Morgan 
responded: 
"Your honor, I have appeared before most of the judges of this 
court, and I have the greatest respect for its jurisdiction," Morgan 
said, "but I respectfully decline to answer that, or any other question 
which could lead to the discovery of my niece or further harm to her." 
"As an order of the court, under pain or penalty of contempt, 
answer the question, Mr. Morgan," Dixon said. 
"My answer is the same," Morgan replied, softly but firmly. 
The courtroom fell silent as that line was crossed . . . .182 
Robert Morgan disobeyed twenty-six direct orders to answer questions. 
Although Judge Dixon did not incarcerate Morgan, he reminded him 
that he could, and ordered him to report any change of address or em-
ployment.183 Having risked not only his job but professional discipline 
as well, Robert Morgan was placed on indefinite administrative leave. 
The entire United States Attorney's Office had already recused itself 
from any prosecution which might arise out of Morgan v. Foretich. 184 
After almost twenty-two months, on June 19, 1989, Judge Dixon 
issued a finding that Morgan might yet relent. 186 The Washington Post 
noted that Representative Wolf's bill to limit incarceration for civil con-
179. Washington Post, June 9, 1989, at B3, col. I. 
180. Washington Post, May 25, 1989, at B3, col. 1; srr Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d I 
(D.C. 1989) 
181. Washington Post, June 10, 1989, at AI, col. I. 
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tempt (see infra section IV) was progressing through the House, and 
added: 
Last week, moreover, the appeals court reversed Dixon's use of 
his contempt power in an unrelated case. 
Although that case concerned criminal, not civil, contempt, the 
appeals court used broad language to admonish Dixon that "the Su-
preme Court has taken special pains to emphasize that courts should 
exercise great restraint in using the contempt power."186 
C. Public Outcry 
Judge Dixon's judgment was questioned long before that rebuke. 
Morgan had become "one of the best-known female prisoners in the 
country, and something of a cause celebre among mothers who have 
claimed that their children have been abused by noncustodial fa-
thers."187 Outraged that "the woman has been jailed without a trial, 
without being found guilty of any crime, for a year," one columnist 
wrote: 
She is not the first, nor will she be the last, child whose mother be-
lieves she has been sexually abused by the noncustodial parent. This 
is the only case, however, at least around these parts, where the 
mother has done a year of time for contempt, where litigation has 
gone on for so long, where a child has been forced into hiding, and 
where the livelihoods of both parents have been jeopardized if not 
destroyed. Other parents and other judges, quite obviously, have fig-
ured out less destructive ways of handling these cases.188 
"Not a single person has benefited from the heavy-handed handling of 
this case," the columnist fumed. "Dixon ignored evidence he didn't 
want to hear, then tossed the key away on a mother trying to protect 
her child."189 
A professor of law who worked for Morgan's release issued a 
more judicious criticism: 
Coercive contempt concentrates in the judge's hands the state's power 
to deprive a citizen of liberty without the usual checks from a prose-
cuting attorney, a grand jury, and a jury. Judge Dixon's initial fact-
finding, that Dr. Morgan's charge of abuse was not proved, is preca-
rious and potentially incorrect; the cost of an incorrect prediction is 
I 86. Morgan, 564 A.2d I, 7 (D.C. 1989). 
187. Judy Mann, The Hem•y-Handed Judge, Washington Post, Aug. 26, 1988, at C3, col. 4. 
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high, perhaps as high as a child's twisted and tormented psyche. 190 
Even if Dr. Morgan's story were false, the incarceration had done 
Foretich no good. Everyone was losing: Morgan, Hilary, the taxpayers. 
But what if the story were true? Either way, civil contempt "focuses 
state power in a way that makes us uncomfortable and sometimes pro-
duces results that appear outrageous. " 191 
The result certainly appeared outrageous to the National Organi-
zation for Women and Friends of Elizabeth Morgan. The two groups 
held a joint rally after Dr. Morgan had been in jail fifteen months. 
Alice Monroe, coordinator of Friends of Elizabeth Morgan, reported to 
the crowd that Judge Dixon had found the evidence "in equipoise," 
and asked: "[If] you thought you had a 50-50 chance of being raped on 
the way to the movie, would you go ?"192 Columnist Anthony Lewis 
attended one of the hearings in which Morgan sought to prove that she 
could not be coerced. "I found myself disturbed as I seldom have been 
by a legal proceeding," he wrote. 193 Morgan described the six-foot-wide 
cell she shared, the showers and toilet open to view, the blaring music, 
and explained that she endured such conditions because Hilary "begged 
me to hide her."194 "Suppose the evidence, partially heard, was 'in 
equipoise' on sexual abuse," Lewis argued. "Even that made un-
supervised visits too grave a risk."1911 
One snide writer called Morgan "the thinking woman's Tawana 
Brawley" and explained the controversy thus: "Morgan, a super-
achiever who had previously failed at nothing in her life, and also 
something of a self-dramatizer, was humiliated and bitter" because of 
her brief and unsuccessful marriage to Foretich. 196 Far more common 
was the attitude of Mary McGrory, who wrote: "It takes more than a 
hunger for melodrama and vengeance to explain why Elizabeth Mor-
gan stays in jail." This woman "had it all: a lucrative practice as a 
plastic surgeon, a fine house in Northwest, a new and distinguished 
fiance." She abandoned it all only because "jail is better than the hell 
of imagining what was happening to her daughter."197 McGrory ob-
190. Rendleman, Enough Is Enough: Set Dr. Morgan Frrr, Legal Times, Sept. 12, 1988, at 
I, col. I. 
191. /d. 
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jected to the exclusion of much relevant evidence, including a "harrow-
ing passage" in which Heather describes "what 'Daddy' did to Hilary 
in the course of a weekend visit."198 Even after such evidence was ex-
cluded, Judge Dixon's own statement that the evidence of abuse was in 
equipoise "makes his order for unsupervised visits incomprehensible," 
said McGrory. 199 
"It is a story that will not leave my mind," Lewis began a second 
column.200 "[B]y now the imprisonment is lowering public respect for 
law. Relentless disregard of humane concerns is never good for the 
law."201 Even the Washington Post editorialized, "[T]he judge has long 
since proved his point. Why is he continuing to make an example of 
Dr. Morgan?" Her continued imprisonment "serves no purpose."202 
After nearly twenty-three months of incarceration, Morgan reiter-
ated her intention to stay in jail until Hilary turned eighteen. "I gave 
up my daughter. I gave up my family. I barely see them. I gave up my 
fiance. We wanted to get married. I gave up my practice. But, in ex-
change, I wanted God to protect my child, and He's made it possi-
ble."203 As columnists and talk show hosts around the country featured 
the Elizabeth Morgan story, it became apparent that judicial insensitiv-
ity to child abuse victims and protective parents was perhaps the rule 
rather than the exception. "There are many mothers before me who 
have done this," said Morgan, lamenting "case after case in this coun-
try of judges who don't believe."204 Attorneys at the National Center on 
Women and Family Law claimed to have represented several clients in 
Morgan's position. 2011 Women in other jurisdictions have also been in-
carcerated under similar circumstances.206 
A 1979 study estimated that one female child in five is sexually 
abused. Most incidents of abuse are not reported; those that are re-
ported rarely result in convictions.207 While Morgan remained in an 
overcrowded jail "with no room for murderers, rapists and robbers," 
wrote one columnist, a tragically high percentage of children are sexu-
ally abused each year-in most cases, by a close relative. 208 Morgan 
198. !d. 
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had become a "national symbol of mothers protecting incest victims."209 
Letters and phone calls demanding action began pouring into Congress. 
IV. CONGRESSIONAL RESPONSE 
A. Bills Introduced 
1. H.R. 2136 
On April 26, 1989, Representative Frank R. Wolf (R-Va.) intro-
duced H.R. 2136, a bill 
to amend the District of Columbia Code to limit the length of time for 
which an individual may be incarcerated for civil contempt in a child 
custody case in the Superior Court of the District of Columbia and to 
provide for expedited appeal procedures to the District of Columbia 
Court of Appeals for individuals found in civil contempt in such a 
case. 210 
Senator Orrin G. Hatch (R-Utah) introduced S. 1163, a similar bill, 
on June 13, 1989.211 Wolf's bill limited incarceration to eighteen 
months; Hatch's bill limited incarceration to twelve months. Both bills 
were inspired by Dr. Elizabeth Morgan's plight, and both were retro-
active to January 1, 1987, in order to cover her. However, neither was 
a private bill to release only her. Both bills would have applied to any-
one similarly situated in the District of Columbia. The bills were lim-
ited to the District of Columbia because Congress has no authority to 
limit the contempt power of state courts, and child custody actions are 
not brought in the federal courts. 
H.R. 2136 was scheduled for a hearing before the Subcommittee 
on Judiciary and Education of the Committee on the District of Co-
lumbia on May 23, 1989. Foretich's attorney, of course, criticized the 
bill, but groups fighting child abuse praised it, hoping that it would 
inspire similar reforms in the states and prevent other people from fac-
ing Morgan's dilemma. 212 Several experts testified at the hearing, in-
cluding Ronald Goldfarb, Doug Rendleman, and Robert Martineau.213 
All had at least minor suggestions for improvement in the bill, but all 
agreed that the contempt power should be limited. Goldfarb worried 
about the separation of powers; the pardon is an executive power, he 
argued, and this bill looked like a pardon for Elizabeth Morgan. But 
209. Mann, Rnoh•ing a Contnnptiblf /ssuf, Washington Post, May 5, 1989, at C3, col. 4. 
210. H.R. 2136, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CoNe. REG. H1427 (1989). 
211. S. 1163, 101st Cong., 1st Sess., 135 CoNe. REG. 56532 (1989). 
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Rendleman, who discussed the potential for abuse of the contempt 
power and favored curbing it, was supportive. Martineau, who helped 
draft a 1980 Wisconsin statute limiting incarceration for contempt to 
only six months, reported that the limit resulted in no detectable in-
crease in defiance of court orders. Representative Wolf also testified in 
favor of the bill, expressing concern that Morgan had been jailed longer 
than some violent criminals. Replying to critics of the bill, Wolf said 
that it would not be fair to change the law prospectively only and leave 
Morgan unprotected.214 
Shortly thereafter, Representative Wolf published a defense of his 
bill in Roll Call, the unofficial newspaper of Capitol Hill. He wrote: 
I believe that in cases such as this the interests of the child are para-
mount. We must think of the child first . . . . I do not believe that a 
child who is denied the care of either of her parents is being well 
served. 21 ~ 
Keeping Morgan in jail, he continued, would not help find Hilary. If 
Morgan had not submitted to the court order after eighteen months, she 
was simply not going to. 
A system which punishes a child by allowing a parent who has been 
convicted of no crime to be imprisoned indefinitely-longer than 
many drug dealers, burglars, and armed robbers-without producing 
compliance, does not serve the interests of the child involved or of the 
parents involved. The law needs to be corrected and my legislation is 
a solid starting point. 216 
2. S. 1163 
On June 13, 1989, Senator Hatch introduced his bill, S. 1163. 
Seeking co-sponsors, he circulated a letter to all senators which argued: 
In disputes where one parent refuses to produce the child for the 
other and the court invokes its civil contempt power to incarcerate the 
recalcitrant parent, the child is indefinitely deprived of both parents. 
One such parent is Dr. Elizabeth Morgan, who has now spent 
22 months in jail. Hers is a Hobson's choice: either surrender her 
daughter to someone she believes sexually abused the child or stay in 
214. Torry, Bill to Limit Ci<•il Conlflnpt Smtma DPbatNl in Shadow of Jailnl Doctor, 
Washington Post, May 24, 1989, at B3, col. 1. 
215. Wolf, ElizabPth Morgan Casf: What Can Congrpss Do~ Roll Call (the Newspaper of 
Congress), May 29-June 4, 1989; rPprintNI in 135 CoNG. Rt:c. H3244 (Daily ed. June 27, 
1989). This argument is disingenuous; the bill is designed to protect contemners, not their chil-
dren. Children may benefit incidentally, but they may not. Morgan's release notwithstanding, 
Hilary remains without the direct care of either parent. 
216. !d. 
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jail indefinitely. I am not taking sides in the Morgan-Foretich dis-
pute. I believe, however, that under such circumstances a mother's 
sense of protectiveness should not be punished forever. Regardless of 
the merits of Morgan's particular case, present D.C. law regarding 
civil contempt does not take into account unique concerns arising in 
child custody cases. 
Mothers in other jurisdictions have also been imprisoned under 
the contempt power for refusing to send their children to court-
ordered visitations with ex-husbands accused of sexual abuse. The bill 
I introduce today simply places a 12-month cap on imprisonment for 
contempt in such cases in the District of Columbia. Its effect on the 
administration of justice will be negligible, but the limited changes 
applicable to child custody cases would afford necessary protection not 
only to parents but to children, who are the real losers in such 
cases. 217 
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Senator Hatch presented an extensive statement along with the 
bill. After outlining some of the dangers of the contempt power, he 
emphasized the inappropriateness of using civil contempt for punitive 
purposes. Citing Shillitani v. United States,218 he said: 
Once it is clear that the civil contempt sanction will not coerce a re-
calcitrant individual, that sanction must be removed. The failure to do 
so constitutes a deprivation of liberty or property without due process. 
That is, the coercive sanction is transmuted into a punitive sanction at 
the point coercion can no longer fairly be said to be possible and, 
therefore, the contemnor is entitled to further procedural protections 
before the sanction can continue.219 
Senator Hatch argued that this point had been reached already in Eliz-
abeth Morgan's case. 
Her medical practice has disappeared, along with her home and other 
assets, and she is now the longest-residing female prisoner at the D.C. 
Detention Center. She has nothing left to lose. She insists that she 
will never comply with the court order, an assertion to which her 
adamance thus far lends credence. There is no indication that contin-
ued imprisonment will change her mind. She appears immune to the 
coercive authority of the court. 220 
Senator Hatch noted that nobody in the District of Columbia had ever 
served as long for civil contempt. "In a jurisdiction perpetually releas-
217. Dmr Collmgur letter from Senator Orrin G. Hatch (June 13, 1989). Again, the inten-
tion to protect children is laudable, but the bill really protects parents. 
218. 384 US. 364, 371-72 (1966). 
219. 135 CoNG. REc. S1163 (daily ed. June 13, 1989) at 4. 
220. /d. at 4-5 (emphasis added). 
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ing those apprehended on drug busts and sweeps because the jails lack 
room for them, scarce jail space could be better used."221 He then re-
ferred to Dixon's questioning of Robert Morgan222 and protested: 
The specter is now raised of the court incarcerating Dr. Morgan's 
brother for civil contempt as a means of increasing the pressure on 
Dr. Morgan herself. If this happens, I suppose the judge could feel 
free to jail Dr. Morgan's relatives seriatim over the next 12 years 
before determining she will not be coerced. Enough is enough. 223 
Turning to the merits of his bill, Senator Hatch noted that Cali-
fornia limits imprisonment for contempt to twelve months; Wisconsin 
limits it to six months; under 28 U.S.C. § 1826, uncooperative wit-
nesses may not be incarcerated longer than eighteen months; and the 
Supreme Court has prohibited incarcerating criminal contemnors 
longer than six months, unless they receive or waive a jury trial. 224 
Surely similar protection for civil contemnors was appropriate. "The 
bill I introduce today simply recognizes that after a year continued im-
prisonment is unlikely to coerce a contemnor in a child custody case to 
comply."225 
Senator Hatch next observed that evidence of child sexual abuse 
may be sufficient to convince a well-trained physician or therapist but 
insufficient to convince a court. In such a case, when the parent of the 
abused child refuses to submit to court-ordered demands to allow the 
alleged abuser access to the child, many courts are sentencing the re-
calcitrant parent, which is typically the mother, to contempt. Some 
mothers have gone underground rather than submit to the court, and 
taken the child with them. Others have gone to prison rather than 
risk endangering their children.226 
Limiting incarceration for civil contempt m such cases, he concluded, 
was "a prudent and needed step."227 
B. Committee Action 
1. H.R. 2136 
In the House of Representatives, the Committee on the District of 
Columbia amended H.R. 2136 heavily. The amended bill provided: 
Z21. /d. at 4. 
222. 5ff supra note 181 and accompanying text. 
223. 135 CoNG. REc. S1163 (daily ed. June 13, 1989) at 6. 
224. /d. at 9, II. 
225. /d. at 10. 
226. /d. at 12. 
227. /d. 
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(b)(l) [No] individual may be imprisoned for more than 12 con-
secutive months for civil contempt ... for disobedience of an order or 
for contempt committed in the presence of the court. 
(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1 ), an individ-
ual who is charged with criminal contempt pursuant to subsection (c) 
may be imprisoned until the completion of such individual's trial for 
criminal contempt, except that in no case may such an individual be 
imprisoned for more than 18 consecutive months for civil contempt 
(c)(1) An individual imprisoned for 6 consecutive months for 
civil contempt for disobedience of an order ... who continues to dis-
obey such order may be prosecuted for criminal contempt for disobe-
dience of such order at any time [within a year of imprisonment] 
(2) The trial of an individual prosecuted for criminal contempt 
pursuant to this subsection-
(A) shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which 
such individual is charged with criminal contempt; 
(B) shall, upon the request of the individual, be a trial by jury; 
and 
(C) may not be conducted before the judge who imprisoned the 
individual for disobedience of an order .... 228 
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Conspicuous by its absence was any restriction limiting the bill to child 
custody cases. It applied to all cases without regard to subject matter. 
"Although the amendments to the District of Columbia Code in this 
legislation would affect Dr. Morgan's incarceration," said the Commit-
tee, "H.R. 2136 is not intended to provide a per se legislative remedy 
for her. It is intended to correct a problem in the present law."229 On 
June 20, 1989, the full Committee favorably reported H.R. 2136, as 
amended, by a vote of 9 to 1. 
Meanwhile, Morgan v. Fort'lich was progressing in the media, if 
not in the courts. Appearing on Cable News Network on June 27, 
1989, Foretich offered to abandon his visitation rights if Hilary was 
returned to the area. Morgan, by then imprisoned for twenty-two 
months, counseled Foretich to admit his wrong, apologize for it, and 
seek help. 230 
228. H.R. REP. No. 98, !Olst Cong., 1st Sess. 1-2 (1989). 
229. /d. at 3. 
230. Washington Times, June 28, 1989, at A2, col. 1. 
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2. S. 1163 
On July 21, 1989, the Senate Subcommittee on General Services, 
Federalism and the District of Columbia held a hearing on S. 1163.231 
A Maryland judge testified from experience that in "99. 9%" of the 
cases the mere threat of incarceration coerced compliance. Though con-
cerned about limitations on judicial authority, he conceded that a long 
enough limit, such as twelve months, should protect contemnors with-
out unduly restricting judicial prerogatives.232 Professor Rendleman 
testified that lack of a statutory cap allowed "arbitrariness, capricious-
ness, harshness, [and] futile imprisonments."233 He noted similar limits 
in other areas of law, such as statutes of limitation and debtor exemp-
tion statutes.234 Given that Supreme Court decisions already require 
the release of a civil contemnor whose continued incarceration would be 
punitive, Rendleman rhetorically asked, why should the legislature im-
pose a specific cap? Because, he answered: 
Judicial decisionmaking is usually not effective at specific line-
drawing. The judicially developed rules are imprecise. Lawyers can-
not be sure what evidence to present or how to argue the issues. Trial 
judges are left at large about how to decide. The standard for appel-
late review extends a lot of deference to the trial judge's discretion. 
In short the judicial doctrines commit too much unchecked power 
to a single fallible trial judge. Nothing guarantees that an individual 
trial judge will be convinced. The decision ends up depending on the 
particular judge's subjective choice.23~ 
On the distinctions between H.R. 2136 as amended and S. 1163, 
Professor Rendleman testified: 
The H.R. 2136 procedure for the transition from coercive to criminal 
contempt is difficult to understand and will be cumbersome to effect. 
It will, I predict, not be utilized frequently and will mean an effective 
cap of 12 months. Perhaps the wiser course is for Congress to decide 
when to terminate coercive contempt and eliminate the technicality. 
S. 1163 chooses this course. This is the approach Congress took in 
Section 1826, the recalcitrant witness statute. 236 
Witnesses noted that since the District of Columbia Code did not dis-
231. S. REP. No. 104, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1989). 
232. /d. at 4. 
233. /d. 
234. Hearings on S. 1163 Before the Subcomm. on Gmeral Sen•icrs, Frdnalism, and the 
District of Columbia, JOist Cong, 1st Sess. 3 (1989) (statement of Doug Rendleman, Professor of 
Law). 
235. /d. at 3. 
236. /d. at 5. 
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tinguish between criminal and civil contempts, S. 1163 would actually 
cap incarceration for all contempts. Senator Hatch testified that that 
was not his intention and agreed to technical amendments which would 
rectify the error in drafting. 237 
At the hearing, the subcommittee polled out S. 1163 by a vote of 5 
to 0. On July 26, 1989, the full Committee on Governmental Affairs 
held a markup. Senator Jim Sasser (D-Tenn.), Chairman of the Sub-
committee, offered a technical amendment with Senator Hatch's ap-
proval to clarify that the cap applied only to civil and not to criminal 
contempt. 238 The committee intentionally avoided the amended H.R. 
2136 approach, preferring a strict one-year cap, without exceptions. 239 
The committee also accepted Senator Hatch's preference for a bill lim-
ited to the child custody context.240 Senator Levin announced that he 
might offer an amendment on the Senate floor which would make the 
provisions of S. 1163 automatically expire after three years and would 
direct the Judiciary Committee to consider, during that time, whether 
the limit ought to apply to all categories of contempt and to all federal 
courts. 241 The full committee reported the bill favorably by a vote of 14 
to 0.2"2 
In response, a Washington Times editorial charged: "Although the 
measure at first blush seems neutral, everyone on the Hill knows that it 
is designed to free Dr. Elizabeth Morgan .... " 243 "Congress," ob-
served the Times, "having invited itself into the quagmire of the Mor-
gan case, now wants to treat a legal proceeding as a political event. 
That can only create a basis for politicizing future cases in the Dis-
trict." Obviously the writer hadn't spoken to anyone directly involved 
with the bill. "Dr. Morgan may be right," the Times conceded. "If so, 
her best course would be to press her charges in court and seek legal 
permission to deny Dr. Foretich visitation rights."244 The editorial 
failed to point out that that was precisely what Morgan had already 
done. 
Senator Hatch pushed to get the full Senate to pass his bill before 
the August recess. Several senators, however, including the majority 
leader, had qualms. Senators Levin and Sasser worked out a compro-
237. S. REP. No. 104, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. 4-5 (1989). 
238. !d. at 5. 
239. !d. at 8. 
240. !d. at 4, 9. 
241. !d. at 10. 
242. !d. at 9. 
243. Eliwhrlh Mor[;all rz11rl lhr '.\'n/ Court, Washington Times, Aug. 2, 1989, at F2, col. 
1. 
244. !d. 
276 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 4 
mise including an eighteen-month sunset. 245 The bill was further 
amended to require the Senate Judiciary and Governmental Affairs 
Committees to study civil contempt in both District of Columbia and 
federal courts and report back to the Senate by September 1, 1990.246 
On September 7, 1989, the Senate approved an amended H.R. 2136, in 
lieu of S. 1163, by unanimous consent. 247 
C. Public Law No. 101-97 
On September 20, 1989, the District of Columbia Court of Ap-
peals, sitting en bane, heard oral arguments in Morgan's appeal from 
Judge Dixon's ruling keeping her imprisoned. 248 However, after forty-
nine motions, fifteen appeals, and four full oral arguments before the 
court of appeals, Congress was not going to wait any longer.249 That 
night, the House of Representatives concurred in the Senate amend-
ments conforming H.R. 2136 to S. 1163 and adding minor amend-
ments.250 The Senate concurred in the House amendments, passing the 
bill by unanimous consent shortly after midnight on September 22, 
1989.251 The Washington Post reported strong lobbying for the bill 
from sources as diverse as Charles W. Colson of Prison Fellowship 
Ministries, former Democratic Party Chairman Robert Strauss, billion-
aire H. Ross Perot, various feminist groups, Alice Monroe, Glennie 
Rohelier, and the 15,000 other Friends of Elizabeth Morgan.252 
President Bush signed the District of Columbia Civil Contempt 
Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989 into law on Saturday, September 
23, 1989. The law limits incarceration for civil contempt in child cus-
tody proceedings in District of Columbia courts to twelve months. 253 
After six months the contemnor can be prosecuted for criminal con-
tempt for continuing disobedience of the order. 254 A contemnor may be 
held up to eighteen months pending prosecution for criminal con-
tempt.255 The Committee on Governmental Affairs of the Senate and 
245. 135 CoNG. REC. S10811 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989) (statement of Senator Levin). 
246. /d. 
247. 135 CoNG. REc. S10820 (daily ed. Sept. 7, 1989). 
248. Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1989, at Dl, col. 6; SPP also Morgan v. Foretich, 564 A.2d 1 
(DC 1989). 
249. Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1989, at A 1, col. 1. 
250. Washington Post, Sept. 21, 1989, at Dl, col. 6; 135 Cong. Rec. H5788 (daily ed. Sept. 
20, 1989). 
251. Washington Post, Sept. 23, 1989, at AI, col. I; 135 CoNG. REc. S11704 (daily ed. Sept. 
22, 1989). 
252. /d. 
253. Pub. L. No. 101-97, §§ 2(a), 2(b), 103 Stat. 633 (1989). 
254. /d. 
255. /d. 
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the Committee on the District of Columbia of the House of Represent-
atives are to study civil contempt in the District of Columbia courts.2116 
The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate is to study civil con-
tempt in the federal courts. 2117 The Senate Committees are to report by 
September 1, 1990, and recommend changes to existing law. 2118 The 
law became effective upon enactment and expires after eighteen 
months.2119 
On September 25, 1989-two years and one month after enter-
ing-Dr. Elizabeth Morgan left the District of Columbia jail. Accom-
panied by her fiance, Judge Paul Michel, she hugged her brother and 
expressed gratitude for her release. 260 Of course, the legal battles are 
not over. Hilary remains subject to Judge Dixon's authority. Judge 
Dixon could conceivably cite Morgan for criminal contempt. Foretich 
sued for defamation-an action which Morgan welcomed, since it will 
allow her to present evidence in an open trial by jury.261 But the indefi-
nite, unlimited incarceration is over. 
D. judicial Response to the Congressional Action 
Predictably, the very judges who had allowed the situation to dete-
riorate to the point where congressional action was required were quick 
to denounce the congressional action. "D.C. Superior Court judges ex-
pressed outrage yesterday that Congress had poached on judicial turf," 
reported the Washington Post. The judges considered the new law a 
"terrible and dangerous precedent," "frightening," an example of "pri-
vate justice." "Hard cases make bad law," said one262-an observation 
which applies to the judiciary's handling of the matter more accurately 
than to Congress's. Replied Harvard Law Professor Laurence H. 
Tribe: "I think they are up the constitutional creek without a paddle 
.... I can appreciate the judges' anger, but I don't think they have a 
constitutional leg to stand on."263 Tribe could have quoted the Supreme 
Court: 
[O]ver the years in the federal system there has been a recurring ne-
cessity to set aside punishments for criminal contempt as either unau-
thorized by statute or too harsh. This course of events demonstrates 
256. /d. at § 4(a)(1 ). 
257. !d. at § 4(a)(2). 
258. /d. at § 4(b). 
259. !d. at § 5. 
260. Gellman, ElizabPth Morgan FrPrd i\ftrr 759 Days in Jail, Washington Post, Sept. 26, 
1989, at AI, col. 1. 
261. /d. 
262. Washington Post, Sept. 28, 1989, at Cl, col. 2. 
263. !d. 
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the unwisdom of vesting the judiciary with completely untrammeled 
power to punish contempt, and makes clear the need for effective safe-
guards against that power's abuse.264 
V. IMPLICATIONS FOR BROADER REFORM 
A. Previous Proposals 
For years before Congress acted, numerous commentators had rec-
ommended limiting the contempt power. One urged judges to apply the 
reasonable doubt standard of proof to civil contempt proceedings.266 
Another proposed abolishing the distinction between civil and criminal 
contempt altogether, as Wisconsin has done. 266 Another proposed statu-
tory limitations on civil contempt in "the spirit of due process."267 Such 
limits would leave courts free to maintain order by summarily punish-
ing direct contempts. But others argued that even summary punishment 
for direct contempt should be limited.268 Some went so far as to recom-
mend abolition of summary contempt altogether. 269 The Law Reform 
Commission of Canada recommended that contemnors receive the same 
procedural protections as other defendants and suggested a maximum 
punishment of two years imprisonment.270 Ronald Goldfarb proposed 
replacing the general power of contempt with a statutory offense called 
"misdemeanor to government," to be "applied as all other criminal 
laws, consistent with guaranteed rights of criminal procedure."271 
B. Extend to Other jurisdictions and Other Contexts 
Despite numerous recommendations, actual reforms were rare. 
Thus, even though the District of Columbia Civil Contempt Imprison-
ment Limitation Act was extremely limited-affecting only civil con-
tempt in child custody cases in the District of Columbia, for eighteen 
months-it represented a significant step in the right direction. Now it 
264. Bloom v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 194, 206-07 (1968) (citations omitted). 
265. Mascolo, Proadural Duf Proass And Thf Rfasonablf Doubt Standard of Proof In 
Ci1•il Contnnpt Proardings, 14 NEW ENG. ]. ON CRIM. & Civ. CoNFINEMENT, 245, 274-98 
(1988). 
266. Martineau, Contnnpt of Court: Eliminating thf Confusion Bftwrm Cii•il and Crimi-
nal Contnnpt, 50 U. CIN. L. REV. 677, 687-705 (1981). 
267. Note, Madan Discussion of a Vmaablf Powa: Ci1•il Vasus Criminal Contnnpt and 
its Rolf in Child Support Elljormnmt: Hicks v. Feiock, 22 CREIGHTON L. REV. 163, 185 
(1988). 
268. Sfr, f.g., Comment, Thf Rolf of Duf Proass in Summar)' Contnnpt Procndings, 68 
IOWA L. REV. 177, 194 (1982). 
269. N. DoRSEN & L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 96, at 219. 
270. R. Martin, sujna note 94, at 310. 
271. R. GoLDFARB, supra note II, at 301-03. 
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is time to take further steps. If incarceration for civil contempt ought to 
be limited in District of Columbia courts, it ought to be limited in all 
courts. If it ought to be limited in child custody cases, it ought to be 
limited in all cases. If it ought to be limited for eighteen months, it 
ought to be limited permanently. 
Elizabeth Morgan is not the only protective parent convicted of 
contempt; mothers and fathers in other jurisdictions have faced the 
same dilemma she did. 272 While the District of Columbia courts may 
have been unusually heavy-handed in allowing Morgan's incarceration 
to continue so long, nothing prevents courts in other jurisdictions from 
making similar mistakes. Child custody is not the only context within 
which abuse of the civil contempt power can occur; civil contemnors in 
other kinds of cases are equally at risk. And there is certainly nothing 
unique about the next eighteen months. 
Wisconsin has limited incarceration for all kinds of contempt to six 
months. 273 California has limited incarceration for all kinds of con-
tempt to twelve months. 274 Other states should follow their example. 
The Supreme Court already has held that the Constitution re-
quires a jury trial to incarcerate a criminal contemnor for more than 
six months. 2711 Recognizing the punitive aspects of civil contempt, it 
should apply the same rule to civil contemnors. 
C. Arguments Against Reform 
Dr. Morgan won a great deal of sympathy because she appeared 
to be a protective parent. What if the contemnor were a less sympa-
thetic figure-for example, an abusive parent? Opponents of reform 
cite the case of Jacqueline Bouknight, a Baltimore woman incarcerated 
for contempt for refusing to produce her son Maurice. Born in October 
272. Note, supra note 267 at 183 n.195; see also Washington Post, Aug. 28, 1988, at C1, 
col. 1 (final ed.), and Washington Post, May 22, 1989, at D1, col. I. In one case, a father in 
Nevada refused to return his two children to the mother in South Carolina when a child psycholo-
gist found that the oldest was experiencing trauma at the prospect of returning. Both children 
appeared neglected, exhibiting symptoms of mistreatment including improper nourishment. A Ne-
vada court gave the father temporary custody, but the South Carolina court found the father in 
contempt and ordered him to produce the children or go to jail. Curlee v. Howle, 277 S.C. 377, 
287 S.E.2d 915 (1982); m 35 S.C.L. REv. 118, 119-20 n.81 (1983). 
273. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 785.04 (West 1981); Martineau, supra note 266. 
274. CAL. PENAL Com: § 19a (West Supp. 1990). California's Constitution guarantees the 
right to trial by jury for all criminal offenses above the level of infraction; this includes contempt, 
which is considered a misdemeanor. Mitchell v. Superior Court, 43 Cal. 3d 107, 729 P.2d 212, 
232 Cal. Rptr. 900 (1987). A long line of California cases considers all contempt proceedings 
criminal. In Re Feiock, 180 Cal. App. 3d 649, 653 (1986); Note, Modern Discussion of a Vrner-
able Powrr: Ci1•il Vrrsus Criminal Contnnpt and its Rolf in Child Support Enformnrnt: Hicks 
v. Feiock, 22 CREIGHTON L. REv. at 177. 
275. SPP supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
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of 1986, Maurice suffered a broken thigh, a broken shoulder, a broken 
arm, and a damaged spinal cord before he was four months old-all the 
result of maternal abuse. He was placed in foster care, but a judge 
returned him to his mother. Shortly thereafter he disappeared. Social 
workers assigned to monitor the boy could not find him at home. A 
homicide investigation produced no leads, but authorities fear the boy is 
dead. 276 
Opponents of reform argue that limiting incarceration for civil 
contempt would require authorities to eventually release Bouknight. 
Actually, the Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act would not 
release Bouknight, even if she lived in the District of Columbia. The 
law applies only to child custody disputes arising in the family division 
of the Superior Court, not to those where the state finds abuse and has 
reason to remove the child from the home. 277 Even if the new law did 
apply to Bouknight, she could still be charged with criminal contempt 
for her continuing violation of the order to produce her son.278 
Of course, an across-the-board cap could free Bouknight-and 
many others. As noted during Elizabeth Morgan's lengthy incarcera-
tion, the few civil contemnors who had served as long as she had were 
organized crime figures, terrorists, and other undesirables. While we 
are understandably reluctant to set such individuals free, crimes should 
be punished as such-not through the vehicle of contempt. If 
Bouknight has committed a crime, charge her with it. Give her a trial 
and, if convicted, a sentence. Otherwise, the state has no business leav-
ing her incarcerated indefinitely for civil contempt. 
Penalties for civil contempt are designed to coerce compliance not 
for the court's own benefit, but for the benefit of a third party. If civil 
contempt were limited, the party for whose benefit the penalty is im-
posed would lose leverage and perhaps be unable to obtain in fact what 
he had won in court. For example, Morgan is out of jail, but Hilary 
remains in hiding. How do we know she is safe? Hasn't Foretich been 
deprived of the last connection to his daughter? 
True, we don't know Hilary's condition or whereabouts. 279 But 
we didn't know during Morgan's incarceration, either. Keeping Mor-
gan in jail did nothing to help Foretich realize his rights under the 
court order. A limit on incarceration for civil contempt may hinder op-
posing civil litigants. But so do statutes of limitation, debtor exemption 
276. K!'fjJing Quirt, 75 A.B.A.J. 32, 32-34 (Sept. 1989); .w also Baltimore City Dep't of 
Social Servs. v. Bouknight, 110 S. Ct. 900 (1990). 
277. S REP. No. 104, JOist Cong., 1st Sess. 7 (198'J). 
278. Pub. L. l\o. 101-97, §§ 2(a), 2(b), 103 Stat. 633 (1989). 
279. 13ut 11'1', AFTERWORD, infra. 
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statutes, and other devices through which the law, recognizing that it 
cannot remedy every wrong, in essence says, "Enough is enough." The 
opponent of a civil contemnor rarely suffers more than the victim of a 
violent crime, yet criminal defendants receive numerous protections, in-
cluding statutory limits on the length of their incarceration. Surely such 
protections are appropriate for civil contemnors. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
State legislatures should limit incarceration for civil contempt. Ex-
cept for its restriction to child custody cases, the District of Columbia 
Civil Contempt Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989 serves as a useful 
model. Under the Act courts retain fully their present criminal con-
tempt powers, including the ability to summarily punish criminal con-
tempts committed in their presence. Courts also retain the civil con-
tempt power, but may not incarcerate civil contemnors longer than one 
year. A contemnor who ought to be incarcerated longer can be; but he 
must be charged with criminal contempt for his continuing violation of 
a court order, and thus receive various protections not presently af-
forded to civil contemnors. 
The most common abuses of the contempt power probably result 
not in long-term incarceration, but in short-term incarceration. Con-
temnors who spend a few hours or days in jail are far more common 
than those who spend months or years. Ultimately, no matter how the 
contempt power is limited, a great deal of discretion must remain in the 
hands of the individual judge. A cap on incarceration for civil contempt 
may not sufficiently restrain an intemperate judge in all cases; but it 
will at least prevent the most egregious abuses of the contempt power. 
AFTERWORD 
Hilary was discovered in New Zealand in February 1990. She 
had been cared for since her disappearance by her maternal grandpar-
ents, William and Antonia Morgan. As Dr. Elizabeth Morgan had re-
peatedly insisted, she was safe and in good health. 
The contempt power played a key role in Hilary's discovery as 
well as in her disappearance. Eric Foretich obtained a court order re-
quiring a British Broadcasting Corporation producer in London to tes-
tify. Under threat of incarceration for contempt, the producer disclosed 
information concerning Hilary's whereabouts. Hilary had arrived in 
Plymouth, England, in September 1987. Her grandparents rented a flat 
there and enrolled her in Beechfield College, a private girls' school. 
The headmistress, Pat Holness, said that Hilary appeared well-
adjusted and happy, and that her grandparents "doted on her." She left 
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the school in the summer of 1988.280 On February 23, 1990, Constable 
Paul Hughes of the Christchurch, New Zealand, police, announced 
that Hilary had been located there. 281 
Immediately upon Hilary's discovery, Eric Foretich flew to New 
Zealand intending to bring her back to the United States.282 A New 
Zealand family court, however, ordered Foretich not to contact Hilary. 
The court awarded the grandparents temporary custody on February 
23, 1990, and confiscated their passports.283 Hilary's grandfather 
warned that he would call the police if Foretich tried to contact Hil-
ary.284 "Certainly we're going to do what we need to do to rescue my 
daughter," said Foretich. Replied Elizabeth Morgan: "He has hunted 
her down like an animal. She does not want to see him, and he knows 
that. "28«~ 
Dr. Morgan was unable to leave the United States immediately, 
her passport having been confiscated in the proceedings which led to 
her incarceration.286 However, she spoke with Hilary for the first time 
in two years on Sunday, February 25, 1990, by telephone.287 Judge 
Dixon soon ruled that releasing Morgan's passport would be in Hil-
ary's best interest. The District of Columbia Court of Appeals agreed 
and on March 2, 1990, returned the passport seized three-and-a-half 
years earlier. 288 On March 5, 1990, Dr. Morgan arrived in New Zea-
land and met with her attorneys. She requested that the media respect 
her privacy and refused to discuss when or how she would meet 
Hilary.289 
As of this writing, Hilary remains enrolled at Selwyn House, a 
private school for girls. Perhaps the best summary of her situation ap-
peared in a cartoon printed in the Los Angeles Times. In it, a small and 
solitary girl carrying a suitcase flees from a crowd of rabid reporters, 
their mouths wide open, cameras and microphones protruding from the 
pack like quills from a porcupine.290 Mothers of other students at Sel-
wyn House clearly resent the intrusive reporters, as do the other citi-
zens of Christchurch. According to the Los Angeles Times: 
280. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 24, 1990, at A 1, col. 4. 
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287. San Francisco Chronicle, Feb. 27, at A3, col. l. 
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289. San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 6, 1990, at A6, col. 4. 
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The comment that seemed to resonate the most with the public 
came Wednesday night [February 28, 1990] at a rock concert here [in 
Christchurch], when Elton John dedicated a song, "Sacrifice," to 
Hilary. 
From a piano top, he lamented that she was being "surrounded 
by the worst type of media," and urged the public to "run the bas-
tards out of town." 
His comment-and the roar of approval from the audi-
ence-were broadcast Thursday night as the lead item on New Zea-
land's network news. 291 
283 
Patrick D. Mahony, New Zealand's chief family court judge, or-
dered participants not to speak to the media and warned the media not 
to disclose family court proceedings. Mediation efforts will precede a 
formal hearing. The court has appointed an attorney, Isabell Mitchell, 
to represent Hilary. 292 
Dr. Morgan hopes to live with Hilary in New Zealand and return 
to her career in plastic surgery. 293 
291. Los Angeles Times, Mar. 6, 1990, at E4, col. 6. 
292. !d. 
293. San Francisco Chronicle, Mar. 27, 1990, at AB, col. I. 
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APPENDIX I 
Public Law No. 101-97 
1 01 st Congress 
An Act 
To amend the District of Columbia Code to limit the length of 
time for which an individual may be incarcerated for civil con-
tempt in the course of a child custody case in the courts of the 
District of Columbia, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the "District of Columbia Civil Con-
tempt Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989". 
SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON TERM OF INCARCERATION IM-
POSED FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT IN CHILD CUSTODY CASES. 
(a) SUPERIOR COURT OF THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA.-Section 
11-944 of the District of Columbia Code is amended-
(1) by striking "In addition" and inserting "(a) Subject to the lim-
itation described in subsection (b), and in addition"; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
"(b)(1) In any proceeding for custody of a minor child conducted 
in the family Division of the Superior Court under paragraph (1) or 
(4) of section 11-1101, no individual may be imprisoned for civil con-
tempt for more than 12 months (except as provided in subsection (a), 
for disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the presence 
of the court. This limitation does not apply to imprisonment for crimi-
nal contempt or for any other criminal violation. 
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1 ), an individ-
ual who is charged with criminal contempt pursuant to paragraph (3) 
may continue to be imprisoned for civil contempt until the completion 
of such individual's trial for criminal contempt, except that in no case 
may such an individual be imprisoned for more than 18 consecutive 
months for civil contempt pursuant to the contempt power described in 
subsection (a). 
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"(3)(A) An individual imprisoned for 6 consecutive months for 
civil contempt for disobedience of an order in a proceeding described in 
paragraph ( 1) who continues to disobey such order may be prosecuted 
for criminal contempt for disobedience of such order at any time before 
the expiration of the 12-month period that begins on the first day of 
such individual's imprisonment, except that an individual so imprisoned 
as of the date of the enactment of this subsection may be prosecuted 
under this subsection at any time during the 90-day period that begins 
on the date of the enactment of this subsection. 
"(B) The trial of an individual prosecuted for criminal contempt 
pursuant to this paragraph-
"(i) shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which such 
individual is charged with criminal contempt; 
"(ii) shall, upon the request of the individual, be a trial by jury; 
and 
"(iii) may not be conducted before the judge who imprisoned the 
individual for disobedience of an order pursuant to subsection (a).". 
(b) DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CouRT OF APPEALS.-Section 11-
741 of the District of Columbia Code is amended-
(1) by striking "In addition" and inserting "(a) Subject to the lim-
itation described in subsection (b), and in addition", and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
"(b)(1) In the hearing of an appeal from an order of the Superior 
court of the District of Columbia regarding the custody of a minor 
child conducted in the Family Division of the Superior Court under 
paragraph (1) or (4) of section 11-1101, no individual may be impris-
oned for civil contempt for more than 12 months (except as provided in 
paragraph (2)), pursuant to the contempt power described in subsection 
(a), for disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the pres-
ence of the court. This limitation does not apply to imprisonment for 
criminal contempt or for any other criminal violation. 
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1 ), an individ-
ual who is charged with criminal contempt pursuant to paragraph (3) 
may continue to be imprisoned for civil contempt until the completion 
of such individual's trial for criminal contempt, except that in no case 
may such an individual be imprisoned for more than 18 consecutive 
months for civil contempt pursuant to the contempt power described in 
subsection (a). 
"(3)(A) An individual imprisoned for 6 consecutive months for 
civil contempt for disobedience of an order in a proceeding described in 
paragraph (1) who continues to disobey such order may be prosecuted 
for criminal contempt for disobedience of such order at any time before 
the expiration of the 12-month period that begins on the first day of 
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such individual's imprisonment, except that an individual so imprisoned 
as of the date of the enactment of this subsection may be prosecuted 
under this subsection at any time during the 90-day period that begins 
on the date of the enactment of this subsection. 
"(B) The trial of an individual prosecuted for criminal contempt 
pursuant to this paragraph-
"(i) shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which such 
individual is charged with criminal contempt; 
"(ii) shall, upon the request of the individual, be a trial by jury, 
and 
"(iii) may not be conducted before the judge who imprisoned the 
individual for disobedience of an order pursuant to subsection (a).". 
SEC. 3. EXPEDITED APPEALS PROCESS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
INCARCERATED FOR CONTEMPT JN CHILD CUSTODY 
CASES. 
Section 11-721 of the District of Columbia Code is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection: 
"(f) The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall hear an ap-
peal from an order of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia 
holding an individual in contempt and imposing the sanction of impris-
onment on such individual in the course of a case for custody of a mi-
nor child not later than 60 days after such individual in the course of a 
case for custody of a minor child not later than 60 days after such 
individual requests that an appeal be taken from that order.". 
SEC. 4. REPORTS ON CIVIL CONTEMPT PROCEDURES. 
(a) IN GENERAL.-(1) The Committee on Governmental Affairs 
of the Senate, together with the Committee on the District of Columbia 
of the House of Representatives, shall conduct a study of current law 
and procedures width respect to civil contempt in the courts of the Dis-
trict of Columbia. 
(2) The Committee on the Judiciary of the Senate shall conduct a 
study of current law and procedures with respect to civil contempt in 
the courts of the United States. 
(b) SUBMISSION OF REPORTS.-Not later than September 1, 1990, 
the Committees on Governmental Affairs and the Judiciary of the Sen-
ate shall each submit a report on the study conducted by each Commit-
tee under subsection (a), and shall include in such report any recom-
mendations regarding changes in current law. 
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SEC. 5. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
The amendments made by sections 2 and 3 shall apply with re-
spect to any individual imprisoned before the expiration of the 18-
month period that begins on the date of the enactment of this Act for 
disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the presence of 
the Superior Court of the District of Columbia or the District of Co-
lumbia Court of Appeals. 
Approved September 23, 1989. 







To amend the District of Columbia Code to limit the length of 
time for which an individual may be incarcerated for civil con-
tempt in a child custody case in the Superior Court of the District 
of Columbia and to provide for expedited appeal procedures to 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for individuals found 
in civil contempt in such a case. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the "District of Columbia Civil Con-
tempt Imprisonment Limitation Act of 1989". 
SEC. 2. LIMITATION ON TERM OF INCARCERATION IM-
POSED FOR CIVIL CONTEMPT. 
(a) SuPERIOR CouRT OF THE DISTRICT oF CoLUMBIA.-Section 
11-944 of the District of Columbia Code is amended-
(1) by striking "In addition" and inserting "(a) In addition"; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections: 
"(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), no individual may be 
imprisoned for more than 12 consecutive months for civil contempt pur-
suant to the contempt power described in subsection (a) for disobedi-
ence of an order or for contempt committed in the presence of the court. 
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1), an individ-
ual who is charged with criminal contempt pursuant to subsection (c) 
may be imprisoned until the completion of such individual's trial for 
criminal contempt, except that in no case may such an individual be 
imprisoned for more than 18 consecutive months for civil contempt pur-
suant to the contempt power described in subsection (a). 
"( c)(1) An individual imprisoned for 6 consecutive months for civil 
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contempt for disobedience of an order pursuant to subsection (a) who 
continues to disobey such order may be prosecuted for criminal con-
tempt for disobedience of such order at any time before the expiration 
of the 12-month period that begins on the first day of such individual's 
imprisonment, except that an individual so imprisoned as of the date of 
the enactment of this subsection may be prosecuted under this subsec-
tion at any time during the 90-day period that begins on the date of the 
enactment of this subsection. 
"(2) The trial of an individual prosecuted for criminal contempt 
pursuant to this subsection-
"(A) shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which 
such individual is charged with criminal contempt; 
"(B) shall, upon the request of the individual, be a trial by jury; 
and 
"(C) may not be conducted before the judge who imprisoned the 
individual for disobedience of an order pursuant to subsection (a).". 
(b) DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA COURT OF APPEALS.-Section 11-
741 of the District of Columbia Code is amended-
(1) by striking "In addition" and inserting "(a) In addition"; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsections: 
"(b)(1) Except as provided in paragraph (2), no individual may be 
imprisoned for more than 12 consecutive months for civil contempt pur-
suant to the contempt power described in subsection (a) for disobedi-
ence of an order or for contempt committed in the presence of the court. 
"(2) Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraph (1 ), an individ-
ual who is charged with criminal contempt pursuant to subsection (c) 
may be imprisoned until the completion of such individual's trial for 
criminal contempt, except that in no case may such an individual be 
imprisoned for more than 18 consecutive months for civil contempt pur-
suant to the contempt power described in subsection (a). 
"(c)(1) An individual imprisoned for 6 consecutive months for civil 
contempt for disobedience of an order pursuant to subsection (a) who 
continues to disobey such order may be prosecuted for criminal con-
tempt for disobedience of such order at any time before the expiration 
of the 12-month period that begins on the first day of such individual's 
imprisonment, except that an individual so imprisoned a·s of the date of 
the enactment of this subsection may be prosecuted under this subsec-
tion at any time during the 90-day period that begins on the date of the 
enactment of this subsection. 
"(2) The trial of an individual prosecuted for criminal contempt 
pursuant to this subsection-
"(A) shall begin not later than 90 days after the date on which 
such individual is charged with criminal contempt; 
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"(B) shall, upon the request of the individual, be a trial by jury, 
and 
"(C) may not be conducted before the judge who imprisoned the 
individual for disobedience of an order pursuant to subsection (a).". 
SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
The amendments made by this Act shall take effect on the date of 
the enactment of this Act. 






To amend the District of Columbia Code to limit the length of 
time for which an individual may be incarcerated for civil con-
tempt in a child custody case in the Superior Court of the District 
of Columbia and to provide for expedited appeal procedures to 
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals for individuals found 
in civil contempt in such a case. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the 
United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. LIMITATION ON TERMS OF INCARCERA-
TION IMPOSED FOR CONTEMPT IN CHILD CUSTODY 
CASES. 
(a) SuPERIOR CoURT.-Section 11-944 of the District of Colum-
bia Code is amended-
(1) by striking "In addition" and inserting "(a) Subject to the lim-
itation described in subsection (b), and in addition"; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
"(b) In any proceeding for custody of a minor child conducted in 
the family Division of the Superior Court under section 11-1101 (1 ), no 
individual may be imprisoned for civil contempt for more than 12 
months, pursuant to the contempt power described in subsection (a), for 
disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the presence of 
the court. This limitation does not apply to imprisonment for criminal 
contempt or for any other criminal violation.". · 
(b) DISTRICT OF CoLUMBIA CoURT OF APPEALS.-Section 11-
741 of the District of Columbia Code is amended-
(1) by striking "In addition" and inserting "(a) Subject to the lim-
itation described in subsection (b), and in addition"; and 
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection: 
"(b) In the hearing of an appeal from an order of the Superior 
court of the District of Columbia regarding the custody of a minor 
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child, no individual may be imprisoned for civil contempt for more than 
12 months, pursuant to the contempt power described in subsection (a), 
for disobedience of an order or for contempt committed in the presence 
of the court. This limitation does not apply to imprisonment for crimi-
nal contempt or for any other criminal violation. 
SEC. 2. EXPEDITED APPEALS PROCESS FOR INDIVIDUALS 
INCARCERATED FOR CONTEMPT IN CHILD CUSTODY 
CASES. 
Section 11-721 of the District of Columbia Code is amended by 
adding at the end the following new subsection: 
"(f) The District of Columbia Court of Appeals shall hear an ap-
peal from an order of the Superior Court of the District of Columbia 
holding an individual in contempt and imposing the sanction of impris-
onment on such individual in the course of a case for custody of a mi-
nor child not later than 60 days after such individual requests that an 
appeal be taken from that order.". 
SEC. 3. EFFECTIVE DATE. 
The amendments made by this Act shall apply with respect to in-
dividuals imprisoned for disobedience of an order or for contempt com-
mitted in the presence of the Superior Court of the District of Colum-
bia or the District of Columbia Court of Appeals in the course of a case 
for custody of a minor child on or after January 1, 1987. 
